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PROJECT CHECO REPORT

Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations

THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

15 APRIL 1968

HQ PACAF

Directorate, Tactical Evaluation
CHECO Division

[redacted]

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Edward C. Burtenshaw

EDWARD C. BURTENSHAW, Colonel, USAF
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AFXPD ..... 9 Cys(44-52)
AFXDOC ..... 1 Cy (53)
AFXDOD ..... 1 Cy (54)
AFXDOL ..... 1 Cy (55)
SAFOI ..... 2 Cys(56&57)
SAFLL ..... 1 Cy (58)
SAFAA ..... 1 Cy (59)

MAJCOM

AU(ASI-HA) ..... 2 Cys(60&61)
AU(ASI-ASAD).... 1 Cy (62)
AU(AUL3T-66-7) . 1 Cy (63)
AU(ACSC) ..... 1 Cy (64)
ADC(ADODC) ..... 1 Cy (65)
ADC(ADOOP) ..... 2 Cys(66&67)
ADC(ADLPP) ..... 2 Cys(68&69)
TAC(DO-O) ..... 1 Cy (70)
TAC(DPL) ..... 2 Cys(71&72)
TAC(DOTS) ..... 1 Cy (73)
TAC(DORQ) ..... 1 Cy (74)
TAC(DI) ..... 1 Cy (75)
MAC(MAFOI) ..... 1 Cy (76)
MAC(MAODC) ..... 1 Cy (77)
MAC(MAOCO) ..... 1 Cy (78)
MAC(MAXDC) ..... 1 Cy (79)
AFSC(SCL) ..... 8 Cys(80-87)
AFSC(SCO) ..... 2 Cys(88&89)
AFLC(MCO) ..... 1 Cy (90)
AFLC(MCF) ..... 1 Cy (91)
ATC(ATXDC) ..... 1 Cy (92)
SAC(DO) ..... 1 Cy (93)
SAC(DPL) ..... 1 Cy (94)
SAC(DXI) ..... 1 Cy (95)
SAC(SCIH) ..... 1 Cy (96)
SAC(OA) ..... 1 Cy (97)
USAFA(OI) ..... 1 Cy (98)
USAFA(DFH) . 1 Cy (99)
USAFE(OPL) . 2 Cys(100&101
USAFSO(NDI). 1 Cy (102)
USAFSO(BIOH) 1 Cy (103)
USAFSS(ODC) .2 Cys(104&105

OTHERS

9AF(DO) .... 1 Cy (106)
12AF(DI) ... 1 Cy (107)
19AF(DA-C) . 1 Cy (108)
USAFAGOS ... 1 Cy (109)
USAFSAWC(DO) 1 Cy (110)
USAFTAWC(DA) 1 Cy (111)
USAFTARC(DI) 1 Cy (112)
USAFTALC(DA) 1 Cy (113)
USAFTFWC(CRCD)1 Cy (114)
FTD(TDPI) .. 1 Cy (115)

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C ..... 1 Cy (116)
DOP ..... 1 Cy (117)
DP ..... 1 Cy (118)
DI ..... 1 Cy (119)
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FOREWORD

With attention of the world focused on the fate of the USS Pueblo, the reaction of USAF units to the incident, and the posture of the United States Air Force in Korea prior to, during, and after the incident become of interest.

Certain facts are evident in a close examination of events as they occurred on 23 January 1968. First, the increasing tempo of U.S. activities within SEA, and the attendant demand for air assets, have materially affected the capabilities of air units within WESTPAC North to respond to emergencies. Second, command arrangements and related responsibilities appear as complicated today as they did 14 years ago. Finally, the importance of achieving central control and direction of all air assets, which was so laboriously learned during the Korea action 1950-1953, has been re-emphasized. All of these points are addressed in detail in the following pages. To permit timely publication, the period covered by this report is 22 January through 29 February 1968.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

By 2200 hours on 27 July 1953, when the Korean action officially ended, the United States Air Force had made significant strides in establishing itself as a potent force within the national military establishment; it was well-equipped and well-manned. Airpower had been accepted as a major capability of the U.S. armed forces. Jet aircraft had required new tactics and application procedures. Joint doctrine had been hammered out for the support of ground forces. 1/

Areas that had caused difficulty for three years appeared to have acceptable solutions. The concept of the Joint Operations Center (JOC) in its close air support role was recognized by U.S. Navy forces. Although a Navy liaison section had been established within the JOC as early as August 1950, it was late June 1953 before the Seventh Fleet finally agreed to assume an integral role. Communications with Fleet units had improved with the addition of single side-band radio circuits, but they still could not keep pace with traffic under emergency conditions. 2/

A Joint Army/Navy/Marine/Air Force Conference, to consider joint air-ground operations, was held in Seoul on 8-22 August 1953. At that time, it was recommended that in future operations integration and control of service assets should be secured by an organization and system similar to the ones in use during the last month of the Korean hostilities. The conference also emphasized the need for a joint air-ground doctrine, which would encompass all services. Significantly, this problem still exists in SEA. 3/

Through the period 1954-1964, the USAF commitment to Korea remained approximately the same. (Appendix I.) Command arrangements remained much as they were at the time of the cease-fire, with the exception that 314th Air Division had been reconstituted as the USAF Command element in Korea. Details of these arrangements will be covered later in the report. 4/

Although Fifth Air Force had undertaken the support of air operations in Southeast Asia early in 1964, and continued it through 1965 by means of an extensive TDY program (Appendix II), it retained a sizable in-being force. On 30 June 1964, Fifth Air Force had: 5/

	SQUADRONS	AIRCRAFT/MISSILES
	8 Tactical Fighter	200 F-100/F-105
	4 Fighter Interceptor	86 F-102
	2 Tactical Recon	32 RF-101
	3 Bomb (Tactical)	48 B-57
	1 Aerial Refueling	20 KB-50
	1 Recon	17 B-57/C-130/C-97
	1 Tactical Missile	32 TM-96
TOTALS:	19 Aircraft Squadrons	403 Aircraft

The Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964 began a chain of events that would materially affect the alert posture of Fifth Air Force, and especially of forces in Korea.

Operation CLEAR WATER had caused major changes in both capability and force structure within Fifth Air Force. By 30 June 1965, the overall force

had been reduced to 204 fighter aircraft. The tactical bomb squadrons had been deployed to 13th Air Force, and the refueling squadron had been discontinued. Itazuke Air Base had been placed in DOB status (Appendix III). 6/

Throughout the balance of 1965 and into 1966, TAC rotational squadrons were deployed to Fifth Air Force. This assisted in maintaining the combat capability during the period, but was no lasting solution to the problem. Detailed rotations are shown in Appendix IV.

Fifth Air Force continued to deploy TDY forces in SEA during this period. In addition to Fighter Squadron deployments, Tactical Reconnaissance support of specific operations included: 7/

ABLE MABLE - Photo Reconnaissance missions flown over South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and Laos from Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam.

UNIT	AIRCRAFT	DEPLOYMENT DATES
15 TRS	12 RF-101C	Oct 64 - 1 Feb 65
45 TRS	12 RF-101C	1 Feb - 6 Nov 65*

*The 20th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) from Shaw AFB moved PCS to Tan Son Nhut and assumed this commitment.

GREEN PYTHON - Expansion of Fifth Air Force RF-101 photo reconnaissance activity over North Vietnam from Udorn AB, Thailand:

UNIT	AIRCRAFT	DEPLOYMENT DATES
15 TRS	12 RF-101C	Apr - 31 Dec 65

The drawdown of Fifth Air Force assets continued during the first half of 1966. However, now the units were being sent PCS instead of TDY. In June 1966, the 612th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) (18 F-100s) from Misawa, the 34th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) (18 F-105s) from Yokota, and the 13th TFS (18 F-105s) from Kadena were transferred to SEA. By the end of July, the assigned A/C structure of Fifth Air Force was: 8/

SQUADRONS/GROUP	AIRCRAFT/MISSILES
7 Tactical Fighter	18 F-100; 108 F-105
1 Fighter Interceptor	26 F-102
1 Tac Recon	16 RF-101
1 Recon	2 RB-57 - 11 C-130
1 Tactical Missile Gp	32 TM-76

In addition to the PCS of units, aircraft assigned to Fifth Air Force units were being used as replacements for SEA losses. These units have remained in Fifth Air Force, but lost assigned aircraft to meet SEA attrition requirements as indicated: 9/

UNIT	AIRCRAFT	DATE
36th TFS	18 F-105	30 Nov 66
44th TFS	18 F-105	31 Dec 66
15th TRS	16 RF-101	31 Dec 66
35th TFS	18 F-105	31 Mar 67
67th TFS	18 F-105	30 Nov 67

After this redeployment and replacement program was instituted, the posture of Fifth Air Force was adversely affected. By 31 December 1967,

the on-hand aircraft strength had been reduced to: [10]

SQUADRON/GROUP	AIRCRAFT/MISSILES
4 Tactical Fighter	36 F-105s; 36 F-4Cs in training status
1 Tactical Recon	14 RF-4C against UE of 18
1 Fighter Interceptor	26 F-102s
1 Recon	2 RB 57F - 11 C-130s
1 Tactical Missile Gp	32 TM-76s

This overall reduction in strength over the period 1964-67 is shown in Appendix V. In late 1966, Fifth Air Force was requested to submit recommendations in response to queries posed by Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, during his visit to Japan in September 1966. The submissions contained a proposed force structure for Japan, Okinawa, and Korea; emphasis was placed upon the strike, reconnaissance, and air defense missions. [11]

In addition to the military objectives addressed in the study, certain other objectives were supported. These were:

* Reduction of USAF personnel presence in Japan and the Ryukyus.
* A long range favorable relationship with Japan.
* Reduction of gold flow.
* Implementation of the dual-basing concept, providing a nucleus for rapid expansion in event of contingencies.

Two principal proposals were included. The first recommended a single fighter-type aircraft be deployed to Fifth Air Force, which would materially

reduce maintenance and supply difficulties. The F-4, in several configurations, was selected as the best aircraft vehicle to support the plan. The second proposal concerned the force structure and proposed that three squadrons be programmed and based in Korea. This included: [12]

1 24 UE F-4D Sq at Osan

1 24 UE F-4D Sq at Kunsan

1 24 UE F-4E Sq at Taegu

The engineering work necessary to upgrade these three airfields was included as a part of the package cost.

By basing squadrons at the three Korean bases, an effective all-weather Tactical/Air Defense capability in Korea was created. Such an organization furnished the basis upon which additional force augmentation to meet contingencies could be established. Fifth Air Force also proposed that the aircraft inventory of the ROKAF be upgraded as follows: [13]

PRESENT	FY 70	5AF RECOMMENDATION
2 F-86D Sq	2 F-86D Sqs	---
4 F-86F Sqs	1 F-86F Sq	1 F-102 Sq*
2 F-5 Sqs	5 F-5 Sqs	8 F-5 Sqs
1 RF-86F Sq	1 RF-86F Sq	1 RF-86F Sq*

* While equipping the ROKAF with F-4Es would be highly desirable from the air defense standpoint, MAP funding limitations doubtless would preclude this action. The same rationale applies to the replacement of the RF-86s with more modern recce aircraft.

Although this proposal was well received by PACAF and within the Air Staff, the portion dealing with basing units at Osan, Kunsan, and Taegu was not concurred in. In a message to CINCPACAF, [14/] the Air Staff indicated that the Secretary, after reviewing both the Fifth Air Force submission and the PACAF and Air Staff comments, believed the aircraft total could be reduced and a dual-basing concept used more widely. PACAF and Fifth Air Force views on the Secretary's suggestion were requested. A final decision was deferred pending the completion of a post/SEA PACOM posture study.

Although the Pueblo incident, and the action involving the North Korean attempt to assassinate South Korean President Chung Hee Park, (Blue House incident) shocked the Free World, both were only part of an increasing campaign of terror and subversion being conducted by the North Korean forces. In 1965, there was a total of 42 incidents in and near the DMZ. In 1966, this figure was approximately the same: 37 incidents. In 1967, however, there was a dramatic increase. By 25 August 1967, there had been a total of 367 reported incidents. This would indicate an annual rate of 1,100 percent greater than in recent years. [15/]

Prior to 1966, most DMZ infiltration activity consisted of single agent penetrations. In the past year, the pattern has changed, with multiple-member teams using a campaign of ambush and hunter/killer type operations in the DMZ. These attacks display an increasing viciousness and indicated detailed planning and excellent execution. [16/]

In addition to the DMZ activity, the increasing number of incidents

involving North Korean infiltrators has focused attention on what appears to be North Korean plans for guerrilla activities in the ROK, probably in the late spring of 1968. This could take the form of terror attacks, hunter/killer operations, assassinations, (including high ranking U.S. personnel) or sabotage and possibly fairly large (up to 100 men) guerrilla raids against suitable targets including U.S. barracks, air bases, and Hawk sites. Reports on captured agents indicate an increased level of training, with emphasis on such subjects as use of demolitions, armed and unarmed combat, mountain survival, ambush techniques, assault methods for attacking military installations, and methods for organizing underground cells. Furthermore, North Korean officers have been sent to South Vietnam to study guerrilla tactics and techniques employed by the Viet Cong. 17/

CHAPTER II

PUEBLO INCIDENT

The seizure by North Korean forces of the USS Pueblo in international waters on 23 January 1968, has created a storm of discussion and triggered a series of actions, which have had far-reaching effects. After the initial outrage at the seizure had abated, a number of questions concerning the action were raised at the highest level of government. The purpose of this report is to examine the USAF posture during and after the incident, and the actions that were the direct result of it.

Pueblo Background

The operation that took the USS Pueblo to the geographical position where it was seized was but one of a series of similar operations that had been conducted over the past several years in the WESTPAC area. Coordination between Fifth Air Force and the responsible U.S. Naval officials on similar operations was a matter of record. In all instances, Fifth Air Force had been made aware of a particular operation and had provided assistance whenever requested.

The series of operations was nicknamed "Clickbeetle" and since 11 November 1966, nine similar sweeps had been conducted. A resume of these operations is shown in Fig. 2-1.

Although information on each mission was provided on a routine basis to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, specific assistance in terms of an aircraft alert had only been requested and provided on two previous operations. During

Clickbeetle IX, from 11 November through 8 December 1966, and Clickbeetle XV, from 22 August through 16 September 1967, Fifth Air Force was requested to provide strip alert aircraft.

To accomplish this support during Clickbeetle IX, two F-105s at Kadena were uploaded with 20-mm ammunition and rockets, and the aircrews were placed on 15-minute alert during daylight hours. 2.75 rockets were also loaded on 10 F-102 alert aircraft at Naha. None of these forces was employed, since active air support was not requested. 1/

Fifth Air Force was requested to support Clickbeetle XV and again placed aircraft on alert status. To provide support, two additional F-102s, loaded with 2.75 rockets, were added to the normal complement of alert F-102s, and placed on a 30-minute alert at Naha. This force was also not required. 2/

After the request for support of Clickbeetle IX had been received, requirements for support of similar future operations were anticipated, and Fifth Air Force directed that munitions be prepositioned in Korea, to upload the F-100s and F-105s located there for training, if the need arose. This posture was maintained during Clickbeetle X for the entire period that the USS Banner was in the prescribed operating area, although no air support request from Navy sources ever materialized. 3/

Additional support for two other Clickbeetle operations, XIII, from 22 May to 25 June 1967, and XIV, from 13 July to 10 August 1967, was not required, either because of mission cancellation, or route adjustment of the vessel involved. 4/ There were 16 such missions, either planned or executed,

PRECIS OF USS BANNER/PUEBLO OPERATIONS
(Last Ten Operations Only are Shown)

NAME	DATE	AREA	SPT REQ	FURNISHED	REMARKS
Clickbeetle IX	11 Nov-10 Dec 66	E. China Sea	Yes	Yes	10 F-102s, 2 F-105s Kadena
Clickbeetle X	30 Jan-23 Feb 67	E KORCOM Coast	No	Conditional	Prepositioned munitions
Clickbeetle XI	19 Mar-13 Apr 67	Vladivostok	No	No	
Clickbeetle XII	1 - 19 May 67	Vladivostok	No	No	ASW exercise
Clickbeetle XIII	22 May-25 Jun 67	E. China Sea	Yes	No (planned)	Mission cancelled after two delays
Clickbeetle XIV	13 Jul-10 Aug 67	Vladivostok to Pt Ivan (49.30N)	Yes	No	Banner's route adjusted south to 47.00N
Clickbeetle XV	21 Aug-15 Sep 67	E. China Sea	Yes	Yes	2 F-102s 30 min alert
Clickbeetle XVI	23 Oct-15 Nov 67	Vladimar Bay	No	No	
Clickbeetle XVII	1 Dec-16 Dec 67	E. China Sea	No	No	313 Air Div alerted
Ichthyic I (Pink Root I)	8 Jan-4 Feb 68	E. KORCOM Coast	No	No	Pueblo taken 23 Jan 68

All others cancelled.

FIGURE 2-1

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and 5AF was requested to support only two of these.

The Ichthyic I, (Pink Root I), was the code name for the scheduled Pueblo mission. Fifth Air Force had been an info addressee for the Pueblo mission plan (Ichthyic I), but no air support had been requested of 5AF units. 5/

5AF Posture Prior to 23 January

The drawdown of 5AF forces, as related in Chapter I, required 5AF to undertake a vigorous conversion program, as new aircraft began to arrive in theatre, and to begin the slow, tedious process of reconstituting units.

The original planning documents reflected 5AF units beginning conversion training in FY 68, with the F-105 units changing to F-4C aircraft. The initial plan was for three 24 UE F-4C squadrons at Yokota Air Base. This was changed several times and eventually ended up with three 18 UE squadrons at Yokota AB, Japan, and two 18 UE squadrons at Misawa AB, Japan. The original arrival date of the first F-4 was changed from July 1967 to October 1967. (Fig. 2-2.) The decision on whether to equip 5AF with the F-4C or the F-4D also changed, with the F-4C finally getting the nod early in 1967. 6/ The aircraft were to be obtained from SEA assets as SEA units converted to F-4Ds. This required a revision in the conversion program for 5AF, and resulted in the last 5AF unit to begin receiving its aircraft in March 1968. This was in contrast to the original schedule with a closing delivery date of November 1967. 7/

This conversion program had left 5AF with one complete, fully operational squadron--the 12th TFS at Kadena. It was equipped with F-105s, and on 23 January possessed 24 aircraft, of which 18 were operationally ready (OR). To man these aircraft, 23 formed crews were available. 8/

Additionally, the 82d Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS) at Naha, Okinawa, possessed 25 F-102 aircraft, 23 of which were OR. The 80th TFS, Yokota AB, had not completely begun conversion training, and still possessed 8 F-105s, 7 of them being OR. However, there were 6 assigned OR crews. 9/

The lone tactical reconnaissance unit possessed by 5AF was the 15th TRS at Kadena. It possessed 18 OR crews and 14 RF-4C aircraft with 10 aircraft OR. 10/

Training status of the units undergoing conversion training at Yokota and Misawa revealed they were a good way from becoming completely OR. For example, on the morning of 23 January, the 35th TFS and 36th TFS, Yokota, had completed 33 percent and 8 percent of their required training, respectively. 11/ The 356th TFS, Misawa, was 83 percent completed, but the 67th TFS had not begun their training, nor did they possess any aircraft. 12/

As a recap, on the morning of 23 January, 5AF possessed: 71 Tactical Fighter aircraft, 43 of which were OR; 25 intercentors, with 23 OR; 14 reconnaissance aircraft, 10 OR; and 71 OR crews, exclusive of the interceptor crews. 13/ These aircrew totals did not include crews whose commanders had the prerogative of declaring mission capable.

ORIGINAL F-4D CONVERSION PROGRAM

	JUL 67	AUG 67	SEP 67	OCT 67	NOV 67
35 TFS	9	9			
36 TFS	9	9			
356 TFS		18			
80 TFS			18		
XXX TFS (67TFS)				8	10

REVISED F-4C CONVERSION PROGRAM

	OCT 67	NOV 67	DEC 67	JAN 68	FEB 68	MAR 68
356 TFS	18					
35 TFS		18				
36 TFS				18		
80 TFS					18	
67 TFS						18

FIGURE 2-2

5AF Posture on 23 January

Fifth Air Force aircraft deployments on the morning of 23 January 1968 were as follows: 14/

35th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Yokota AB	2 F-4s SIOP Alert, Osan, Korea 1 F-4 Spare, Osan, Korea 14 F-4s (6 OR) at Yokota AB
36th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Yokota AB	5 F-4s (1 OR) at Yokota AB
80th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Yokota AB	6 F-105s (5 OR) at Yokota 2 F-105s TDY SEA
356th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Misawa AB	2 F-4Cs SIOP Alert, Kunsan, Korea 1 F-4C Spare, Kunsan, Korea 1 F-4C Training Mission, Kunsan, Korea 1 F-4C Training Mission, Yokota AB 12 F-4Cs (6 OR) at Misawa AB
12th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Kadena AB	4 105s SIOP Alert, Kadena AB 20 105s (14 OR) at Kadena AB
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Kadena AB	14 RF-4Cs (10 OR) at Kadena AB
82d Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Naha AB	25 F-102s (23 OR) at Naha AB 2 F-102s on 5-min alert 2 F-102s on 30-min alert 4 F-102s on 1-hour alert 15 F-102s on 3-hour alert

A recap of forces available to Fifth Air Force shows:

71	Tactical Fighters possessed, of which 43 were OR
25	Interceptors possessed, of which 23 were OR
14	Reconnaissance A/C possessed, of which 10 were OR
82	Formed crews (exclusive of interceptors)

(NOTE: Aircrew totals include crews whose commanders had the authority to proclaim mission capable.)

In Korea:

7	F-4Cs with 4 on SIOP alert, 2 spares, and one on a training mission. These were the USAF Tactical Forces available in Korea.

Chronology of Events--23 January

Although 5AF was neither required nor requested to provide any preplanned support for the Pueblo's mission, the actions taken by 5AF, subsequent to their learning of the Pueblo's need for assistance, were both positive and rapid. The actual time of notification to 5AF, which described the Pueblo's situation and requested assistance, has been the subject of some dispute between the Navy and 5AF.[15/]

(ALL TIMES LOCAL IN JAPAN.)

1345L The Commander, Naval Forces, Japan, states the Duty Officer in the Navy Command Center initiated the alerting call to 5AF at 1335L Japan time. Fifth Air Force states the time could have been no earlier than 1345L, and possibly as late as 1400L. A subsequent personal inquiry by the 5AF Commander established the call could not have been received at the Fifth Air Force Communications Center (5AFCC) earlier than 1345L.[16/]

The Navy request for assistance came over the classified telephone system in the form of a routine call from the Navy Duty Officer asking for a specific 5AF officer by name. No emergency was indicated and no precedence or priority was given for the call. The duty officer and duty NCO of the Command Center monitored the

call but, as no emergency or precedence was indicated, the exact time of receipt of the call was not documented. 17/

Attempts to locate the officer, with whom the Navy Duty Officer had requested to speak, were unsuccessful as the officer (who was not assigned to the Command Center), was away from Hq 5AF on temporary duty. His assistant was located and requested to go to the Command Center to accept the call. The Navy Duty Officer then advised the assistant of a code word, the Pueblo's position, and the fact that she was being circled by MIG aircraft and three North Korean boats, and was under attack. Neither the code word given, nor the name Pueblo, meant anything to the 5AF officer, so he asked for a complete repeat of the message. The same information was given again with the term "formerly Clickbeetle" being added. The 5AF officer had heard this term before but, because no precedence had been given for the message, he assumed it to be some sort of exercise. The officer then started for an office he knew to be familiar with the term. En route, he encountered the Seventh Naval Fleet Liaison Officer (NFLO) to 5AF, and asked him if the message had any meaning to him. The NFLO replied that it did and he would take care of the matter. The NFLO then proceeded to the Command Center. The next twenty minutes were consumed in receiving another phone call from the Navy duty officer who was asked for message confirmation, briefing appropriate officers, plotting the Pueblo's

position, and requesting the current status of 5AF units.[18] The NFLO, was joined by the Asst. DCS/Operations, 5AF, and the Chief of the Recce Division, 5AF, and all proceeded to the Commander's Office.

1415L The Commander 5AF, stated that, without a doubt, the party entered his office at 1415L, plus or minus 1 minute. A quick briefing followed, in which the Commander was shown a DIRNSA message, handed to the Asst. DCS/Ops just before he entered the Commander's office. The message was stamped with a 1407 local time of receipt and stated the Pueblo was being boarded at 1345L.[19]

1420L The Commander proceeded to the Command Center, where he placed a classified call to CINCPACAF. The time then was between 1420L and 1425L, Japan time. While waiting for CINCPACAF to get to a secure telephone, the Commander, 5AF, placed a call to the Commander, 18th TFW, and directed that he prepare for immediate, incremental deployment of his F-105s to Osan, Korea. He was instructed to prepare to launch the first six available aircraft with loaded guns only in order that the deployment might be expedited.[20]

1446L During his conversation with the CINCPACAF at 1446 local, the Commander, 5AF, informed him of his proposed actions in deploying the F-105s to Korea. CINCPACAF approved the deployment and the intent to go to the aid of the Pueblo, provided that non-nuclear

armed aircraft could reach the scene prior to darkness, and prior to the time the Pueblo entered the three-mile limit.

1448L The Commander, 5AF, directed the 18th TFW to deploy the maximum number of F-105s to Osan. A subsequent call from PACAF restricted the F-105 deployment to Korea to 12 aircraft and later directed the movement of 3 RF-4Cs from Kadena to Osan. The first F-105 aircraft were airborne within 1 hour and 23 minutes from the time of notification but did not arrive at Osan until 1735 local.[22/]

Subsequent conversations between CINCPACAF and the Commander, 5AF, were directed at General McKee's concern whether Kadena aircraft could reach Korea, be turned around, and arrive at Pueblo's position prior to the hours of darkness. For this reason, the 5AF Commander requested permission to download the SIOP F-4s at Osan and Kunsan, and send them to the aid of the Pueblo provided they could be configured with non-nuclear weapons in time. This was approved and the necessary downloading of the SIOP force was directed.[23/]

During the interim period, the Commander, 5AF, also directed all other aircraft of Fifth Air Force be brought to an operational ready status and that all aircrews be alerted for deployment on an hour's notice.[24/] Responding to this, the Commanders of the units at Misawa and Yokota, 475th TFW and 347th TFW, advised 5AF of the number of crews that could be called Combat

Capable or Mission Capable. These were crews which were not OR but could perform in an emergency.[25]

1640L The Commander, 5AF, made the decision not to launch the F-4s from Korea. His decision was made in the context of the following considerations:[26]

1. The aircraft could not reach the objective area until dusk or later.

2. The 314th Air Division Commander had reported North Korean MIGs had formed a screen between launch bases and the objective area. Thirty tracks were being plotted that had responded to the ADC scramble of two ROKAF F-5 aircraft (two ROKAF aircraft were kept airborne for the rest of the afternoon by the 314th Air Division Commander). The F-4s had no air-to-air capability.

3. NFLO advised Commander, 5AF, that Pueblo was entering the three-mile limit.

It was neither possible to achieve a retaliatory strike, nor demonstrate a show of force that could be effected prior to sunset or without violating the three-mile limit. The F-4s were not configured and the F-105s were not scheduled to arrive at Osan until after 1700 local, and then required an additional hour for arming and turnaround.[27]

2332L The Commander, 314th Air Division called and was informed by Maj. Gen. Timothy F. O'Keefe, Deputy Commander, Fifth Air Force, that, although 5AF aircraft were under his operational control, he would not launch any aircraft into the Wonsan area unless directed.[28]

The Commander, 5AF, began to make plans for the next day should his force be required. Three RF-4Cs from Kadena were sent into Osan, but would not arrive until 24 January, and he made preparations to stage his Japan-based F-4s through Itazuke, so they would be capable of a more rapid reaction to events in Korea. 29/ However, acting on CINCPAC's advice, the proposed use of Itazuke was held in abeyance by PACAF, until the Japanese Government could be properly informed. 30/

By 2400 hours on 23 January, 5AF had deployed from bases outside Korea, a total of 11 F-105s and one F-4C, which arrived at Kunsan from Japan and Okinawa. This brought the number of aircraft available in Korea to 11 F-105s and eight F-4Cs. In addition, one more F-105 arrived at Osan shortly after midnight. By midnight on 24 January, an additional three RF-4Cs had arrived in Korea. 31/ On 25 January, CINCPACAF directed the status quo be maintained and no further forces be deployed to Korea, until he advised this action. 32/

Problems Encountered

During the actions necessary to deploy aircraft to Korea, reconfigure aircraft already in Korea, and bring Japan-based aircraft to a maximum state of readiness, problems expectedly occurred.

The major problems that faced 5AF concerned their low number of possessed aircraft, the low OR rate of aircraft and crews brought about be being in the middle of conversion training, shortage of air-to-air munitions and the political requirements and restraints imposed by the Japanese Government.

At the time of the Pueblo incident, 5AF was down to only one fully operational tactical fighter unit. The capability to respond was limited by the number of possessed aircraft and the experience of the aircrews, which were converting to the F-4 aircraft. The previous combat experience of the aircrews was also comparatively low. 33/

Although there were some aircrews which were considered air-to-air capable, 5AF did not believe they had enough of these F-4 capable crews to insure optimum employment in an air-to-air environment. During the conversion training, emphasis had been placed upon nuclear qualification with the resultant effect that conventional training was just beginning. The same situation applied to aircraft maintenance and armament personnel, who also were still in a training status. 34/

Fifth Air Force air-to-air capability was severely limited at this time due to the lack of F-4 air-to-air ordnance. No SUU-16/23 gun pods or AIM-7 missiles were available within 5AF at the time of the incident. Only a small number of AIM-9 missiles were positioned in Korea; however, they could not be loaded as the launchers and adapter cables for the F-4s were at the MSBs and in the process of being broken out for shipment to the FOLs. Okinawa-based F-105s possessed the only 5AF tactical air-to-air capability at the time of the Pueblo seizure. 35/

Aircraft that were deployed by 5AF had to be reconfigured, either prior to deployment, or upon arrival at their operating base, including the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) aircraft already in place in Korea. For

example, the air-to-air weapons and supporting components actually sited in Korea were limited in number. The fact that tactical fighter aircraft reconfiguration took time, and that there was no single configuration suitable for all operations had been proven again.

Command and Control of forces during deployment, oftentimes a problem, was not a severe one during the 5AF reactions. Operational control of deploying units, minus reconnaissance aircraft, was given to the Commander, 314th Air Division, for the initial days after the Pueblo incident. However, this confirming action was taken a few hours after the initial deployment. 36/

Political considerations figured prominently in the decision process. Japanese sensitivity to use of Itazuke AB as a staging base for F-4Cs was emphasized by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan. 37/ CINCPAC made the decision that Itazuke AB would not be utilized and directed that no aircraft be deployed there. 38/ This increased the reaction time of Japan-based aircraft.

Coordination with the Republic of Korea was required on the move of additional U.S. forces into Korea. The fact that some additional forces arrived prior to official notification caused some official distress. 39/

In summary, 5AF responded rapidly and positively during the request for Pueblo support. Although no aircraft reached the target area on that day, it is very doubtful if things would have been any better had aircraft been placed on alert at Okinawa, as had been done on several occasions in the past.

CHAPTER III

THE BUILDUP

Units Deployed

The Fifth Air Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Seth J. McKee, was notified on 24 January 1968 by telephone from PACAF, to stop all aircraft movements to Korea until further advised. [1] At this time, there were 3 F-4Cs, 12 F-105s, and 3 RF-4Cs at Osan and 5 F-4Cs at Kunsan. Three hours later, another phone call from the PACAF Command Post reconfirmed this order for all units, including the Navy, and certain other Air Force special data gathering flights. [2]

In a message on 25 January, General John D. Ryan, CINCPACAF, confirmed to General McKee, JCS had directed that no increase in force be made in Korea, or aircraft rotated between Main Support Bases (MSBs) and Forward Operating Locations (FOLs). Fifth Air Force was to maintain a strict status quo. [3] General McKee had intended shifting some forces from Misawa and Yokota to Itazuke, Japan, for more rapid deployment to Korea, but General Ryan's message included a decision by Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, CINCPAC, to restrict any F-4 deployments to Itazuke. [4] Therefore, from 25 to 27 January, Fifth Air Force made no aircraft movements and no show of force, but continued to bring all forces to full conventional alert status.

During this three-day freeze on tactical aircraft movements within Fifth Air Force, the U.S. Government was moving rapidly to assess the situation. It had to determine resources available worldwide to meet the threat, and provide PACAF with planning information in the event a decision was made

to augment Fifth Air Force. CSAF notified PACAF of the CONUS forces available for deployment to Northeast Asia (NEA), including Air National Guard and Reserve Forces units available for call-up. Not counting Fifth Air Force fighter resources, this amounted to 3 F-4D and 1 F-100 active duty squadrons, 8 F-100 and 3 F-101 Air National Guard Groups, and 5 C-124 and 1 HC-97 Reserve Forces Groups. (NOTE: As used here, the term "group" refers to a squadron and its support equipment.) This report of available forces reflected the severe drain that SEA had on USAF resources in the CONUS. 5/

On 27 January, the JCS notified CINCPAC, in the form of a movement order, that President Lyndon B. Johnson had approved an 182 tactical aircraft package for deployment to Korea. 6/ Also on that date, CINCUNC, through his diplomatic channels, received from the Republic of Korea, approval for beddown of 182 aircraft at Korean bases. 7/ Deployments from the CONUS were to begin on 28 January.

Code-named COMBAT FOX, the massive deployment to Korea involved moving units from Fifth Air Force, SEA, and TAC. The 334th, 335th, and 336th TFS of the 4th TFW were to deploy from Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina. The 4th was augmented with aircraft and crews from other tactical units to bring the Wing UE from 54 to 72 F-4Ds.

To provide continuity of command during the move, and to augment the 5AF Advance Echelon (ADVON) in Korea, 19th Air Force at Seymour Johnson provided a tactical command element under the direction of Maj. Gen. Robert E. Burns. 8/

From Nellis AFB, Nevada, six specially configured F-105 Wild Weasel aircraft were deployed. (Fig. 3-1.)

In addition to the South Korean Air Force (ROKAF) all-weather air defense forces (two F-86D Squadrons), the move of the 82d FIS from Naha, Okinawa, and the 64th FIS from Clark AB, Philippines, was directed to provide more defense in depth. The 313th Air Division Commander pointed out to 5AF that the move of the 82d FIS left Okinawa without air defense; however, he had no choice but to provide the 25 interceptors. 9/

(NOTE: It was 19 February before the 82d returned to air defense duties at Naha. The F-106-equipped 318th FIS from McChord AFB, Washington, closed at Naha on 11 February--from 30 January to 11 February, Okinawa was without fighter interceptor air defense).

The 355th TFS, an 18 UE F-100 squadron from Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, was to deploy to Cam Ranh Bay, South Vietnam. As the 355th arrived, the 558th TFS (18 UE F-4Cs) was to depart for Kunsan, Korea.

JCS directed that 10 KC-135s and 15 B-52s (PORT BOW) be deployed to Kadena AB, Okinawa, to be responsive to the Korean situation. 10/

In a redistribution of Fifth Air Force assets, and not part of the COMBAT FOX movement, on 27 January the number of F-4C aircraft in Korea was increased to 20 aircraft, and the entire F-4 fleet was consolidated at Kunsan AB. These aircraft were to provide MIG-CAP for certain recce flights being flown near the DMZ. 11/ (NOTE: After the arrival of the 4th TFW at Kunsan AB,

"COMBAT FOX"

UNIT	BASE	EQUIP	DESTINATION
4 TFW	SEYMOUR JOHNSON	72 F4D	KUNSAN
4537 FWS	NELLIS	6 F105	OSAN
19 TEWS	SHAW	6 EB66	OSAN
12 TFS	KADENA	24 F105	OSAN
80 TFS	YOKOTA	4 F105	OSAN
15 TRS	KADENA	14 RF4C	OSAN
64 FIS	CLARK	13 F102	KIMPO
82 FIS	NAHA	25 F102	SUWON
558 TFS	CAM RANH BAY	18 F4C	KUSAN

TOTAL TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 182

FIGURE 3-1

the Fifth Air Force F-4Cs were returned to their respective Japan bases to continue conversion training. Three F-4Cs remained at Kunsan for SIOP alert.)

On 29 January, 16 F-105s from the 12th TFS at Kadena, and 4 F-105s from the 80th TFS at Yokota, deployed to Osan AB, Korea. The four Yokota F-105 aircraft were subsequently reassigned to the 18th TFW, and the crews returned to Yokota to continue conversion training to F-4Cs.

Also on 29 January, the 64th FIS, with 13 F-102s from Clark AB closed at Kimpo, Korea, to become the first force to arrive from outside 5AF assets. In these six days, 29 January to 4 February, Korea received a grand total of 11 RF-4Cs, 38 F-102s, 22 F-105s, 6 EB-66s, 72 F-4Ds, and on 4 February, the 18 F-4Cs from Cam Ranh Bay closed at Kunsan, completing the COMBAT FOX package. (Fig. 3-2.)

In a modification of the original COMBAT FOX deployment, CSAF further deployed 18 F-106s from McChord, Washington, to Okinawa, closing at Naha AB on 11 Feb 68. This completed the total deployment of tactical aircraft the USAF was to provide Fifth Air Force control in support of Korea.

It was now necessary to make some readjustments in force location, so as to relieve congestion and enhance mission capability. Because the F-106 possessed greater air defense capability than the F-102, a decision was reached to exchange the F-106 squadron at Naha, for the 82d FIS in Korea. Osan AB was considered the most advantageous site for the F-106, but no ramp space was available; therefore, the 15th TRS with 14 RF-4Cs and the 19th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons (TEWS) with 6 EB-66s were redeployed to

Itazuke, Japan. The F-106s then moved to Osan on 18 February, and the 82d FIS returned to its home station at Naha the following day. To further relieve congestion at Kimpo Airport, the 64th FIS was shifted to Suwon AB, a move which also provided additional warning time in the event of penetration by unfriendly aircraft. 12/

Operating conditions were far from desirable, but all aircraft were in place in Korea, and manned, by 20 February. The Fifth Air Force F-4Cs, with exception of the aforementioned SIOP alert, were back in Japan.

Conditions were particularly bad at Kunsan (Fig. 3-3), where 90 aircraft were literally parked wing tip to wing tip in every available space. Realizing the extreme vulnerability of these aircraft to enemy action, and wishing to improve operating conditions, Fifth Air Force was to make two final redeployments from Kunsan on 10 March 1968. On this date, the 558th TFS was deployed to Taegu and the 334th TFS to Kwangju. This completed the deployments and readjustments in forces deemed necessary by PACAF and 5AF.

Bases Occupied

Fifth Air Force manned Osan and Kunsan as Forward Operating Location (FOL), with Main Support Bases (MSB) at Yokota and Misawa, Japan. This FOL/MSB concept was adopted by Fifth Air Force to support the SIOP alert forces maintained in Korea. Routine housekeeping and limited maintenance were performed to support the alert forces, but all heavy and field maintenance were performed at the appropriate MSB.

Fifth Air Force requested that the COMBAT FOX deployment operate under

AIRCRAFT LOCATIONS BY BASE

BASE	29 JAN	30 JAN	31 JAN	1 FEB	2 FEB	3 FEB	4 FEB
	AIRCRAFT						
OSAN	16 F105	11 RF4C	6 F105			6 EB66	
KUNSAN			24 F4D	24 F4D		24 F4D	18 F4C
KIMPO	13 F102						
SUWON		25 F102					

FIGURE 3-2

AIRCRAFT/CREW STATUS

5 Mar 68

BASE	TYPE	POSSESSED	OPERATIONALLY READY	MISSION CAPABLE CREWS	REMARKS
OSAN	F-105	28	23	28	2 A/C SIOP 3 A/C KADENA
	F-105WW	6	6	8	
	F-106	18	18	20	2 A/C NAHA
KUNSAN	F-4D	71	59	88	
	F-4C	18	12	21	3 A/C MISAWA
	F-4C(SIOP)	3	3	2	1 SPARE A/C
SUWON	F-102	12	10	17	1 A/C NAHA
ITAZUKE	RF-4C	15	10	14	3 A/C KADENA
	EB-66	6	4	6	
TAEGU					
KWANGJU					

FIGURE 3-3

the FOL/MSB concept, using Japan and Okinawa as MSB for all heavy and field maintenance. To this end, 5AF requested that all in-bound specialists in the heavy and field maintenance areas be diverted to Japan or Okinawa along with their equipment. 13/

In addition to the SIOP forces at Osan, the 314th Air Division operated a small complement of conventional aircraft.

At the beginning of the buildup, Fifth Air Force considered six airfields in Korea as jet capable: Osan, Kunsan, Suwon, Kimpo, Kwanju, and Taegu. 14/ Suwon, Kimpo, Kwanju and Taegu were active ROKAF fighter bases. (Fig. 3-4.)

Because Kunsan and Osan were best equipped to support a sudden influx of airplanes and support personnel, they were chosen as bases to receive the primary tactical forces, while Suwon and Kimpo were selected for siting of the two air defense squadrons.

Having been notified of the size and timing of the COMBAT FOX package, General McKee went to Korea on 29 January, to personally assess the situation at the four bases selected by PACAF, and to evaluate two more bases he believed might be useful. His estimate of the situation was forwarded to General Ryan on 31 January, in a message detailing capabilities to handle the programmed inputs, plus improvements he considered necessary to sustain operations. General McKee recognized these major problems as most urgently requiring solutions: aircraft security; housing; communications; a Tactical Air Control System; airfield improvements; and support personnel. In summary,

General McKee had this to say: [15]

> *"Kimpo will hack its mission. Suwon will hack it with some housing difficulties. Osan will hack it with minor problems, Kunsan is over-crowded, but will hack it with some difficulties."*

In addition, he recommended that Kwangju and Taegu be expanded immediately for purposes of dispersion and/or deployment of additional forces. [16]

This recommendation, for dispersal of forces, did become necessary and was approved. [17]

Beddown Difficulties

Although some deployments had been made prior to 27 January, the real flood began after 28 January. As explained previously, in the six days after the COMBAT FOX go-ahead, totals of tactical airplanes in place were up from 23 aircraft on 24 January, to 35 on 27 January, and then boomed to 95 by 31 January. By 4 February, when the 558th TFS arrived, Kunsan, alone, had more than 90 fighters parked on the base, while overall, Korea had slightly more than 180 tactical aircraft on the ground.

Preceding, and intermingled with arrivals of fighters, were hundreds of arriving and departing logistics aircraft, whose cargo and personnel were discharged.

From a force of 4,600 Air Force personnel in Korea on 23 January, the total personnel on the four bases had risen to more than 12,100 by 4 February, and to more than 12,800 in mid-February, finally leveling at approximately 12,700 personnel. (Fig. 3-5.)

JET CAPABLE AIRFIELDS in KOREA



FIGURE 3-4


PERSONNEL STRENGTH REPORT
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
(4655)
(12110)
(12815)
(12775)
23
31
3
6
10
13
18
24
29
1
6
JAN
FEB
MAR

FIGURE 3-5

There were to be some major beddown difficulties in the overall deployment as mentioned before, but none of them were unanticipated. Among the minor problems, a tactical deployment of this size, even without an emergency, always results in some problems, no matter how well the move is planned and executed. There are always problems of overcrowding, scheduling, transportation, messing, security, housing, misplaced shipments, and attempts to perform operations and maintenance under adverse conditions. There are usually great personal hardships and great personal efforts. (Fig. 3-6.) The COMBAT FOX deployment was no exception. The problems of individuals and units, however, were not out of the ordinary, nor were they insurmountable. The Harvest Eagle kits with tents, lumber, stoves, etc., did not always arrive exactly as scheduled, but eventually wound up at the correct place.

Harvest Eagle kits flown in from Clark and Tainan normally do not contain stoves nor vehicles. Stoves were shipped from other resources to satisfy cold weather requirements. By the evening of 31 January, all Harvest Eagle kits were either delivered, or were inbound to proper destinations. Also on 31 January, seven civil engineering PRIME BEEF teams were in Korea; two each at Kunsan, Osan, and Suwon, and one at Kimpo. [18/] Almost anyone who could drive a straight nail served as a carpenter in an attempt to erect tents as soon as possible. A physiological training officer arriving at Suwon found himself commanding a team of carpenters erecting tents. Frequently, at first, some men might have been cold, hungry, sleepless, and exhausted, but not more so than was to be expected in an operation such as this. General McKee was adamant that housing receive top priority, and that every man have a solid

roof over his head as soon as possible.[19] The manner in which the operational capability was quickly achieved, and overall beddown problems solved, are, to a significant degree, the result of high morale of the augmentation forces. They performed, in the words of one senior officer "in a most magnificent manner."[20]

All bases selected for beddown of the deployed forces presented planners with certain common problems. Inadequate parking space, lack of revetments, deteriorated condition of some ramps and taxiways, housing, communications, and insufficient maintenance shops were common problems to all four bases.

Parking, Pavement, and Aircraft Security

Parking space for aircraft at Osan was limited, but adequate to handle the F-105s, RF-4Cs, and EB-66s when they arrived. Condition of the concrete on some of the hardstands was deteriorating and would have to be replaced or covered with AM-2 matting. The main taxiway was considered marginal for continued heavy use and would have to be beefed up with matting. At Kunsan, parking was considered critical, with heavy dependence on the old runway for parking.[21] (Fig. 3-7.) The surface of the main taxiway, Pad C apron, south runway exit, and warm-up pad were all considered marginal and unacceptable for heavy use without strengthening. The asphalt surface of the old runway softened in warm weather, and would need covering with matting prior to the change in seasons.[22]

"One of my greatest concerns at Kunsan," said General McKee in a message to General Ryan, "is the lack of revetments and dispersal for parked aircraft.

NEW ARRIVALS AT KUNSAN
3 Feb 1968

FIGURE 3-6



F-4Ds ON FLIGHT LINE AT KUNSAN
6 Feb 1968

FIGURE 3-7

I feel we must take priority measures to correct this condition which makes us extremely vulnerable. You will recall I asked for ARMCO revetment materials ASAP to help solve this problem. To the extent practicable, I would like to make each aircraft an individual target. This will require a major construction effort." 23/

The aircraft parking problem at Kimpo was solved by moving into the ROKAF parking area, but there were no alert crew facilities located near the alert pads, and there was mutual interference with taxiing commercial aircraft. The asphaltic parking area and taxiways needed repairing and beefing up before extensive operations could be conducted. Here, as at Kunsan, revetments and aircraft dispersal were required. Kimpo also needed BAK-12 barriers, although MA-1s were in place. 24/

At Suwon, the parking space was better than at Kimpo, but lack of revetments and dispersal affected aircraft security. BAK-12 barriers were required here also. 25/

In his planning survey of Kwangju (Fig. 3-8) and Taegu, General McKee indicated that Kwangju had excellent potential for receiving aircraft, if further deployments were to be made. The ROKAF offered sufficient parking space to accommodate 40 U.S. aircraft. BAK-12 barriers, revetments, and AM-2 matting were to be the most urgent needs. At Taegu, aircraft parking space was the primary problem. Here, as at most of the other bases, revetments would have to be constructed to improve aircraft security, and certain airfield surface improvements made before sustained operations could be conducted.

Taegu would also require portable taxiway and runway lights before scheduling night operations.[26] (Fig. 3-9.)

NAVAIDS, Radar, and ATC

On 31 January, when General McKee forwarded to General Ryan his estimate of the situation, tower, Tactical Air Control and Navigation (TACAN), radio beacon, and UHF/DF service were available and considered adequate at Suwon, Kimpo, Kunsan, Kwangju, Taegu, and Osan. GCA was available at all bases except Osan, where a mobile Radar Approach Control (RAPCON) was in operation. Mobile RAPCONs were ordered deployed to Kunsan and Kimpo along with Tech Reps to aid in commissioning the units. The only base in Korea with ILS was Kimpo.[27]

The FAA agreed to continue working with the USAF to provide flight check service for both ROKAF and U.S. facilities. To this end also, PACAF alerted and held in position a USAF C-140, EC-47, and EC-54 to provide additional flight check service, should it become necessary.[28]

The major Air Traffic Control (ATC) deficiency was considered to be the lack of a radar environment within Taegu Center. The Korean Civil Aeronautics Bureau, (CAB) agreed to establish a high altitude en route radar control sector within the 5AF ADVON area of operations. General McKee proposed locating six FAA Center controllers at the Palgunsan radar site to work in coordination with Taegu Center. Six additional FAA controllers were requested from PACAF. These steps were considered interim fixes, since General McKee ultimately desired to either remote the Palgunsan radar or



STORAGE AREA AT KWANG JU

FIGURE 3-8



U.S. HOUSING AREA AT TAEGU

FIGURE 3-9

provide a radar at Taegu, a requirement he had been trying to validate since November 1966.[29] (Fig. 3-10--Korean Flight Facilities.)

The 2146th Communications Group had personnel in place at Osan, Kunsan, and Kimpo. The ATC personnel at these bases were augmented, plus tower and GCA personnel at Suwon. ATC liaison personnel were also necessary at Taegu Center.[30]

The communications-electronics and NAVAIDS at all ROKAF bases visited by Fifth Air Force personnel on 29-30 January, were operational and in good condition; however, spare parts and test equipment were critical items. ROKAF would undoubtedly need help in these areas in a very short time.[31]

Base Communications

Base communications at Osan, Kunsan, and Kimpo were adequate to handle the initial deployments, but would require major expansion to support prolonged operations. Small telephone exchanges were requested at all four operating bases in an effort to draw the squadrons into a central control net, but in the interim, the ROKAF base phone systems, which were of modern design and operating at 50-80 percent capacity, were adequate. It was in attempted operations between bases that the Korean communications system proved inadequate.[32]

Telecommunications

There were no USA/USAF hard-line telecommunications in-being in Korea. A considerable local market existed for copper wire, and the lines disappeared

almost as fast as they were strung. The basic military long-line communications system was the Eighth Army-operated microwave system known as BACKBONE. (Fig. 3-11.) In full use for USA/USAF base-to-base communications, this system was marginal, and there was very little likelihood it could be improved in a reasonable time frame, since improvements would have to come from in-country resources, using marginally-qualified Army Communications-Electronics personnel. 33/

As an example of a communications problem, the 314th Air Division reported 23 F-102s had closed at Suwon, but they were unable to report their Combat Readiness (CR) status due to lack of communications contact. In the same message, some communications difficulty with Kimpo was also reported. 34/

Tactical Communications

The most critical of the problems facing the deployed forces was lack of a communications sytem that permitted the Commander, 5AF ADVON, to exercise effective tactical control of his forces.

Two communications nets had been established in Korea for use of the ROKAF. The earliest, dating back to 1964, was an ITT-installed troposcatter system, and a later, Philco-installed microwave net (both obtained from Military Assistance Program monies), were designed to tie together the ROK radar and early-warning sites. (Fig. 3-12.) The systems did not interface with each other; however, it was possible to patch the Philco microwave system into the Army BACKBONE, which enhanced long-line communications somewhat. In late January when the buildup began, the ITT Tropo system had been inoperative

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
Flight Facilities

BASE	TOWER	RADAR	TACAN	RBN	D/F	OTHER
OSAN	USAF	MRAPCON	AN/GRN-9	1	UHF	
KUNSAN	USAF	MRAPCON	AN/GRN-9	1	UHF	
KIMPO	MOT	MRAPCON	AN7TRN-6 (2)	3	UHF	VOR ILS
SUWON	ROKAF	GCA	AN/GRN-9	1	UHF	
TAEGU	ROKAF	GCA	AN/GRN-9	2	UHF	
KWANGJU	ROKAF	GCA	AN/GRN-9	2	UHF	

FIGURE 3-10

US ARMY BACKBONE MICROWAVE NETWORK



FIGURE 3-11

for some time. The Far Eastern Communications Region (FECR) Commander attributed this condition to lack of spare parts and inadequate maintenance procedures, not all of which were the fault of the ROKAF. The ROK-operated Philco microwave was available in extremely limited quantities from USAF access point at Osan. The Blue Fortune System was not interfaced with the BACKBONE system. Most circuits to other bases from Osan were provided by USAF TACTICAL and Army BACKBONE circuits. (Fig. 3-12.)

Although the FECR Commander considered this arrangement adequate for insecure voice, General McKee requested more communications equipment in his message to General Ryan on 31 January 1968. Specifically, he required additional duplex teletype terminals and telephone exchanges. He requested microwave and tropo equipment to provide 24 channels from Osan to Suwon, Kimpo, and Kunsan, and 24 channels of tropo to the PY-DO radar site. He requested secure voice KY9s for communications between Fuchu, Japan, and the four operational bases, and two each TSC 54 satellite terminals for communications between Fuchu and Osan.[35/] (Fig. 3-13.)

To augment the 5AF ADVON, the First Mobile Communications Squadron and the Fifth Tactical Control Group were dispatched to Korea from Clark AB, Philippines. Requests for communications equipment and augmentation were timely, but tactical communications during and immediately after the beddown were considered marginal.

Tactical Control System

Since the ROKAF forces had been primarily organized around air defense capabilities, the TACC that existed at 314th Air Division in January was

neither manned nor equipped to match the capability of the 314th ADCC. To overcome this situation and bring the TACC at Osan up to speed, secure voice and teletype communications systems were requested by General McKee. Additional personnel were also requested to augment those on station. Realizing the vulnerability of the 5AF ADVON at Osan, should hostilities erupt, 5AF also requested a TOC/TACC be considered for Taegu. PACAF concurred and directed 5AF ADVON to establish a primary command post at Osan with an alternate TACC/CP at Taegu. In addition, 5AF ADVON was to organize command control systems between the two DASCs, one supporting U.S. Army and one supporting ROK Army. The TACS elements were to be based as follows: 36/

1. AFK TACC - Osan.
2. 5ADVON Command Center - Osan.
3. Alternate TACC/CP - Taegu.
4. I Corps DASC - Uijongbu. ROK Corps DASC to be determined.
5. MDC/CRC - Mangilsan and Palgunsan.
6. DC/CRP - PY-DO, Kangnung, Uisongsong, Yongmuksan, and Drwalson.
7. DC/CRP - Cheju-do.

The personnel to man these TACS elements would have to be requisitioned from outside PACAF resources. The 602d TAC Control Group was deployed from CONUS to man the alternate TACC at Taegu, but was diverted to Osan, while the TACC equipment remained at Taegu for future utilization.

Housing

The weather during the period of the buildup served as an ally of

ROKAF MICRO-WAVE and TROPO NETWORK



FIGURE 3-12

PROPOSED USAF TACTICAL NETWORK



FIGURE 3-13

North Korea. Snow and freezing weather complicated the buildup procedures, making it extremely uncomfortable for the newly arrived forces. Housing was always an important consideration. In January, in Korea, it was vital.

Throughout Korea during the first six days of the buildup, PRIME BEEF teams, augmentees, and housing teams worked to "put a roof" over the heads of all personnel as soon as they arrived. Some bases fared better than others, but all were able to comply with General McKee's 31 January deadline to get all forces inside. This was accomplished with maximum utilization of Harvest Eagle kits airlifted into Korea from Clark, Tainan, and Misawa, using tents from WRM supplies, and borrowing shelters from the Army and ROKs. The Harvest Eagle kit concept demonstrated sound planning, and proved to meet the need in most cases.

Until the bases were able to communicate directly with the Airlift Control Center, certain shipments had to be redistributed among the Korean bases after they arrived, but this direct link was soon established and solved that bottleneck. As previously mentioned, SEA kits arrived without stoves or lumber, but by using other sources for both, stoves were in place by the time tents were erected.

Kunsan presented the most critical beddown problems because it received the largest influx of people. It was estimated that some 600 persons would have to be housed in tents. On 4 February, the day the F-4Cs from Cam Ranh Bay closed at Kunsan, 247 tents had been erected in Korea, 167 of them at Kunsan, where the housing was most critical. By 14 February, more than 460

tents had been erected in Korea by the PRIME BEEF teams. (Fig. 3-14.) Harvest Eagle kits were expedited and as lumber was critical, it was obtained through local purchase at Korean markets. Messing required feeding in shifts at every available dining hall, open mess, and BX cafeteria. 37/

Although ROKAF offered a building that housed 200 men at Suwon, the rest had to be tented. Since lumber was late in arriving, the initial tent city (equipped with stoves), had to be erected on the ground. Messing also had to be conducted in shifts at Suwon.

Suwon and Kunsan were the two most critical bases for housing and messing, but in the long run, their problems were solved to the point that, by 1 February, all men were housed and being fed in heated structures. At Osan and Kimpo, maximum utilization was made of existing facilities to house incoming personnel. Beds were double-decked in lounges, shops, clubs, etc. Some personnel spent a night sleeping on pool tables, in chairs, on desk tops, etc., but they were under cover in heated buildings. (Fig. 3-15.)

Utilities

Every base in Korea was overtaxed for power, and strict conservation was necessary until augmented with portable power units.

Immediate steps were taken to supplement the base water supplies, where local well capacity was incapable of supporting the usage rate.

POL

Suwon was the only base with no USAF storage or pumps, although the ROKAF

TROOP HOUSING AT KUNSAN
4 Feb 1968

FIGURE 3-14

INTERIM HOUSING IN HANGAR AT OSAN
2 Feb 1968

FIGURE 3-15

had considerable storage capability available to the Air Force. Kimpo had inadequate storage available to support sustained operations. To meet anticipated storage needs, bladder storage cells were flown into Korea and positioned at various bases. This additional storage capability, however, was not used, because it was never required.

Transportation

Mechanized transportation and handling equipment were bigger problems than they should have been, primarily because enough vehicles had not arrived in advance of the peak cargo and personnel inputs to handle the distribution. Aircraft unloading was slowed initially because of insufficient Materials Handling Equipment (MHE) to move the pallets, and then when enough MHE did arrive, a bigger bottleneck developed between the aerial port and the user, because enough vehicles were not available to move the goods. In some cases, the MHE, needed at Supply to offload palletized cargo from the trucks, was at the aerial port loading pallets onto trucks.

Trucks, buses, and carryalls from all over PACAF were shipped into Korea. Every available vehicle was operated around the clock and shared by all; shuttles were organized; and even local rentals were arranged.

One of the salient observations out of this deployment has been the incredible capability of modern airlift to move tonnage and people at a near-unbelievable rate--a rate that nearly swamped the receiving aerial port facilities. One of their biggest problems was insufficient transportation capability to move the goods out to the user.

Insufficient numbers of vehicles impeded progress in other areas as well, such as movement of PRIME BEEF teams and their equipment for erecting housing facilities, which had number one priority. In fact, most activities requiring mobility were slowed in those first days when men and cargo were a near deluge.

CHAPTER IV

THE THREAT

The North Korean armed forces represent a formidable force in terms of total manpower, equipment, and training. The industrial base which supports the armed forces is broader and more responsive today than it was in 1950. The damage inflicted during the Korean action (1950-1953) has been repaired, as was true in other countries having industrial bases which suffered damage. North Korea has upgraded many of the industrial plants that were damaged or destroyed by UN airpower. Overall production capability has been increased and the variety of products has doubled. 1/

By and large, the North Korean is a hardy individual with a high level of physical endurance and the capacity to operate under marginal conditions of support and climate. The ground forces have been organized on the Russian model, with great emphasis placed on achieving maximum manpower in combat positions. There are comparatively few ancillary positions such as medics, cooks, clerks, and the like. 2/

Because of the coolness existing between Red China and North Korea for the past several years, the military equipment is largely modeled after Russian prototypes, or has been provided directly by the Russians. Technical assistance has been received primarily from Russian sources for use of Russian equipment. 3/

The equipment actually issued to ground troops is of good to excellent

quality. The majority of the heavy items, such as cannons, vehicles, and the like are of Soviet manufacture. The light equipment, such as handguns, rifles, grenades, and mortars are of Soviet design but manufactured domestically. [4/] Location of the principal manufacturing centers is shown on Fig. 4-1.

As of 23 January 1968, the Ground Order of Battle represented an active force of 345,000, organized into five Army Groups consisting of 19 infantry divisions, 3 AAA divisions, 1 tank division, 10 independent brigades, and 10 independent regiments. [5/] The largest percentage of these forces is deployed along the DMZ as shown in Fig. 4-2.

North Korean Naval Forces consist of some 10,000 personnel equipped with over-age ships of Soviet/CHICOM design. The navy has a capability of protecting coastal waters in peacetime; a limited mine warfare potential; and a coastal patrol and water torpedo boat capability. The submarines have a limited antisubmarine capability. Major weaknesses are the small size of the force, the lack of mobile logistical support, and the age of most assigned units. [6/]

The newest naval acquisitions include seven KOMAR class guided missile boats and their associated STYX missiles, and two SHERSHEN class fast patrol boats. Additional fast patrol boats disguised as fishing boats have been used extensively for agent infiltration.

The naval forces are distributed as follows:


ASSOCIATED DEFENSE INDUSTRIES
(SHIPYARD)
NA JIN
(SHIPYARD)
CH'ONG JIN
KYONGSONG
(ELECTRIC FACTORY)
HYESAN
(TRACTOR FACTORY)
KANGGYE
SINUIJU
NAGWON
(MACHINE FACTORY)
KWANGSONG
YONGCH'ON
(MACHINE FACTORY)
PUKCHUN
(MACHINE TOOL FACTORY)
HUICH'ON
(PRECISION MACHINE FCTRY)
TOKCH'ON
(AUTOMOBILE FACTORY)
YONGSONG
(MACHINE FACTORY)
HAMHUNG
WONSON
(SHIPYARD)
(RR FACTORY)
P'YONGYANG
(PRECISION MACHINE)
NAMPO
(COMMUNICATIONS)
(EQUIPMENT SHIPYARD)
KANGSO
(TRACTOR FACTORY)
SARIWON
HAEJU
CH'UNCH'ON
SEOUL

FIGURE 4-1


CHINA
NORTH KOREA
127°
128°
129°
42°
41°
40°
39°
38°
ARMY O. B.
2 APR 68
ECDC
CHONGJIN
SONGJIN
North Korean Army 345,000
5 ARMY GROUPS - 1, 2, 3, 5, 7
19 INF DIV
1 TANK DIV
3 AAA DIV
5 INF BDE
5 ARTY BDE
1 RL BDE
5 TANK REGT
7 ARTY REGT
1 RECON BDE
XX 11
NAMSI
TAECHON
XXXX 1
XX 14
HAMHUNG
MAYANG-DO
SAACHAM
SUKCHON
PUKCHANG-NI
PYONG-NI
XX 105
XXXX SUNAN-UP
3
KANGSO
PYONGYANG
ONJONG-NI
NAMPO
MND 16
HWANGJU
SONGDONG-NI
XXX 1
WONSAN
KOKSAN
XXXX 5
DMZ
ICHON
PYONGSAN
XXXX 2
HAEJU
KAESONG

FIGURE 4-2

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NKAF AOB



			PHOTO CONFIRMED 26 JAN	PHOTO CONFIRMED 19 FEB
CHONG JIN	PISTON TNGRS	50	50*	50*
HOEMUN-NI	MIG-17	40	40*	40*
UIJU	IL-28	60	60*	60*
TAECHON	TRANSPORTS	43	16	16*
SONDOK	MIG-15/17	35	35*	15
SAAMCHAM	MIG-15/17	100	0	0*
	MIG-19	5	0	0
	MIG-21	0	4	4
	LI/1 ACFT	0	4	4
PUKCHANG-NI	MIG-15/17	25	32	17
	MIG-21	10	0	0
PYONG-NI	MIG-15/17	65	0**	0***
	MIG-21	4	0	0
SUNAN UP	IL-28	20	12	12
	MIG-15/17	15	13	0
	TRANSPORTS	0	5	0
WONSAN	MIG-15/17	70	54	21
	MIG-21	2	0	0
PYONGYANG EAST	TRANSPORTS	0	17	13
ONJONG-NI	MIG-15/17	35	54	8
HWANGJU	MIG-15/17	70	50	20
	MIG-19	2	0	0
	MIG-21	4	0	0
TOTAL		657	446	279

* NOT COVERED
** SNOW ON RUNWAY
*** RUNWAY CLEARED OF SNOW

~~SECRET~~

FIGURE 4-3

WEST SEA FLEET	EAST SEA FLEET
4 Sub Chasers	4 Submarines
8 Motor Torpedo Boats	9 Sub Chasers
6 Motor Gun Boats	23 Motor Torpedo Boats
	3 Motor Gun Boats
	7 Guided Missile Boats
	3 Mine Sweepers

The North Korean Air Force (NKAF) consists of some 23,000 personnel and an aircraft force of approximately 657 aircraft made up of 80 IL-28 bombers, 455 MIG 15/17 fighters, 29 MIG 19/21 fighters, 23 transports, 20 helicopters, and 50 trainers. It is defensively oriented but could pose a limited offensive threat by using MIG 21s from Hwangju and IL-28s from Sunan. An additional capability could be achieved by staging MIG 15/17s from Hwangju, and stretching as far south as Kunsan Air Base, using a low-low-high profile and carrying two 550-lb. bombs. 7/

The Air Order of Battle (AOB) as identified on 23 January 1968, is shown on Fig. 4-3. On 26 January, a BLACK SHIELD photo mission covered nine of the 13 bases occupied. The photography revealed an extensive shuffling of aircraft with some aircraft disappearing from accountability. A second BLACK SHIELD mission flown on 19 February, indicated additional aircraft had either been dispersed to caves known to exist in the area, or had been evacuated to bases in Red China. No additional photo missions were flown prior to 29 February, so the count remains at 279 aircraft identified against an AOB of 657.

The defensive capability of the NKAF could inflict initial losses against an attacking air force. This capability would seriously deteriorate under a sustained attack, because of poor logistical support. The all-weather capability is considered inadequate, as compared to the U.S. or the USSR and the lack of high performance aircraft, with the exception of the MIG-21, would degrade both their defensive and offensive posture. 8/

The continued harassment of U.S. and ROK forces in the DMZ, and the Blue House incident are all positive indications of the North Korean campaign to disrupt political order in South Korea, to tie down large ROK forces, and to encourage insurgency in the south. The North Korean handling of the Pueblo crisis reflects an intention to heighten tensions and exploit the U.S. preoccupation with Vietnam.

All of these developments have hardened Seoul's attitude and increased the possibility of a major ROK reaction to continued North Korean harassment. North Korea probably believes the U.S. will impose restraints on the ROK, and will be reluctant to escalate its responses in Korea. It appears North Korea sees a golden opportunity to exacerbate relations between Seoul and Washington.

A DCS/I, PACAF, Special Study states: 9/

> *"At the same time, however, it is estimated that the North Koreans realize they could not expect to overwhelm the ROK in a new Korean war, and will not, therefore, take actions they consider to involve a high risk of provoking such a war.*

"Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the Blue House raid--which, had it been successful, would almost certainly have provoked a major ROK reaction--the North Koreans are determined to keep unrelenting pressure on the ROK and the US. The major danger in the situation is that Pyongyang, in applying such continued pressure, might miscalculate and force a frustrated Seoul government into ordering large-scale retaliation. In such a case, Pyongyang would most likely feel similarly compelled to respond with a commensurate force and the excalation toward full-scale hostilities would be well under way."

CHAPTER V

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command relationships since 1953 in Korea have been influenced and altered in a large measure by various political agreements.[1/] These include agreements made between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK); the United Nations and the governments providing forces to the United Nations; and U.S. agreements made unilaterally among their own forces. The resultant command relationships resulted in seemingly complex and duplicative command channels. Theoretically, the command to be used was entirely dependent upon proposed actions and forces to be employed to carry out the proposals. The majority of these command arrangements, with the exception of nuclear alert forces, were oriented toward defensive responsibilities.

This defensive posture became one of the factors which led to certain alterations of existing command relationships after the Pueblo incident.[2/] These changes were considered necessary by PACAF and Fifth Air Force to provide a flexible, controlled offensive response capability. Certain of these changes were made immediately after the Pueblo incident; other changes are presently under consideration. These, if adopted, will provide USAF with more permanent and continuing capability to effectively perform all functions of a tactical air force, rather than only those operations which are defensive in scope.[3/]

Because of the complexity of the current Korean command relationships, this chapter is devoted to describing these arrangements as they pertain to

USAF interests. The Tactical Air Control System (TACS), presently being installed in Korea, is included in this discussion.

Command Arrangements - (Dec 63 - Jan 68)

The cessation of hostilities in Korea on 27 July 1953, required that Fifth Air Force change its posture. From an active combat force, it reverted to an alert force committed to maintain a maximum state of combat readiness in order to deter any renewed enemy aggression in Korea. 4/ Although the Fifth Air Force posture became defense oriented, it retained the responsibility for formulating plans for offensive air operations, should they become necessary. These plans included, but were not limited to, air superiority; interdiction; air support of UN land and surface forces; as well as strengthening their air defense capabilities. The Commander, 5AF, was given command and/or operational control of such air units, which might be assigned or attached, and of such UN forces as might be provided. 5/ He reported to Far East Air Force, which was later to become Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). As such, he was also serving as the Air Force Component Commander for Korea, under the United Nations Commander, when he exercised control over forces assigned to the UN. The 5AF Commander did not, however, have operational control over Naval or Marine air units, nor did he exercise any direct control over strategic air forces operating in his area of responsibility. 6/

This arrangement continued until September 1954, when 5AF moved its headquarters from Korea back to Japan, at which time the 314th Air Division (AD) assumed operational control of USAF forces within Korea. 7/ The mission of the 314th AD gradually changed from maintaining a semblance of an offensive

air posture, both in its planning and attitude, to an almost totally defensive alignment. 8/ This increased emphasis on the defensive aspects of air operations was brought about, to some degree, by the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, which restricted the permanent introduction of more modern equipment into Korea. As a result, the permanent units of the 314th AD were gradually deactivated or withdrawn, as their equipment became obsolete and more difficult to maintain. Some of these units were replaced by TDY organizations with newer and better equipment, but these units were generally operationally controlled by Fifth Air Force in Japan.

Mission responsibilities and command relationships were redefined in 1963, with the publication of CINCPAC's 27-Year Plan. From this plan, PACAF developed its Operations Plan (OPLAN) 27-63, which describes the command arrangements: 9/

> *"Responsibilities:*
>
> *...In Korea, CINCUNC exercises operational control of all UN forces assigned in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution of 7 July 1950. CINCUNC exercises operational control of ROK forces in accordance with the Agreed Minutes between the government of the U.S. and the ROK.*
>
> *"By authority of CINCUNC, COMAFK will exercise operational control over all assigned and attached US/UN/ROK air forces. COMAFK is designated by CINCPACAF as the Air Force Component Commander for the PACAF forces to be provided to COMUSKOREA, and shall be an additional responsibility for the Commander, 314th Air Division.*
>
> *"Upon implementation of this plan, COMAFK is responsible directly to CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA for all matters of combined/joint command, except air defense. As a subordinate AF commander, the COM314AIRDIV is responsible to COM5AF for*

uniservice air force matters and for air defense operations (in the Korea Air Defense Sector).

"PACAF forces operating in support of CINCUNC/COMUS KOREA will be under the unilateral command of CINCPACAF. Operational control of these forces will be exercised through the Commander, Fifth Air Force, upon implementation of this plan."

These directives continued in effect from 1963, until the Pueblo incident occurred, during which time the 314th AD Commander wore three hats. First, he was the Air Force Component Commander under CINCUNC, for any actions initiated under UN auspices and employing assigned UN forces. Second, he was Air Force Component Commander, Korea, when operating under the command of COMUSKOREA, which could be either unilateral U.S. actions or bilateral with the ROK's. Serving in the former capacity, COMUSKOREA, he exercises operational control of the ROKAF. Assumption of this role under COMUSKOREA would require concurrence of ROK government. His third hat was his responsibility to the Fifth Air Force Commander for any unilateral USAF actions and for air defense of the Korean Sector. On the day of, but prior to, the Pueblo incident, there were no USAF tactical strike/reconnaissance forces directly under operational control of the 314th AD Commander, regardless of the hat he wore. (Fig. 5-1.)

When the Commander, Fifth Air Force, was initially notified of the Pueblo's need for assistance, he began to deploy the forces available to him. Except for reconnaissance aircraft, deployed units were placed under operational control of the 314th AD Commander for the first few days of the crisis.[10/] The Commander, 5AF, considered these forces to be only in support of CINCUNC/

COMUSKOREA and, as such, were not under operational control of either of these commands. Although he was given operational control as Senior Air Force Commander in Korea, the 314th AD Commander was instructed not to launch any aircraft, as that authority would be retained at 5AF. Additionally, 5AF retained operational control of the reconnaissance aircraft. In effect, the 314th AD was the agency through which the Commander, 5AF, was to exercise control of his forces deployed to Korea. Control of the forces was to remain this way until 29 January 1968, when 5AF Advance Echelon (ADVON) was established, and assumed operational control of all deployed PACAF forces in Korea. 11/

The concept for forming an ADVON was first documented on 27 January. An ADVON was believed desirable, in view of the proposed increase in USAF forces in Korea. The initial ideas regarding mission responsibilities of the ADVON were that the 314th AD would be disestablished, with the ADVON assuming the mission planning and execution activities. Operational control of the forces would be retained at 5AF Rear. 12/ CINCPACAF concurred with the proposal to establish an ADVON, but he recommended a few changes to its organization. He placed operational control of the forces with the ADVON, and retained the 314th AD as an active unit. 13/

CINCPAC agreed with PACAF's proposal, and on 29 January activated the 5AF ADVON, with the Commander, 5AF, assuming additional responsibilities as Commander of the ADVON. 14/ A separate staff was established at the ADVON, which was coequal with the one existing at 5AF proper. The purpose in forming a separate staff was to enhance contingency planning and other

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AF COMMAND RELATIONS IN KOREA



FIGURE 5-1

Briefed by:
Lt Col Schlefstein, 5AF ADVON, 13 Mar 68

SECRET

essential functions for Korean operations, and alleviate them from routine administrative matters unrelated to the situation in Korea. (Fig. 5-2.)

Initial manning for 5AF ADVON was from 5AF's augmentation forces, and personnel from the 19th AF Composite Air Strike Force, who were being deployed, along with other Tactical Air Command units, and CONUS augmentees.

Command relationships, after establishment of the 5AF ADVON, are depicted on Fig. 5-3. The deployed PACAF forces were still to operate in support of CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA, and were not to be assigned to them. 15/

As inidicated in CINCPAC 27-Year Plan, CINCUNC, as the UN forces Commander, would have operational control of all assigned forces in Korea, should hostilities develop, and UN resources used to counter enemy actions. CINCPAC, including CINCPACAF forces, would operate in support of CINCUNC, if this were to occur. 16/ If the enemy forces were not opposed by UN forces, but were met by only U.S. and ROK units, operational control would then fall within the jurisdiction of COMUSKOREA. COMUSKOREA, as a sub-unified command under CINCPAC, would have control of assigned forces; PACAF deployed forces would continue to operate in support only, and would remain under operational control of PACAF, with control being exercised through the Commander, 5AF ADVON. 17/ The 314th AD Commander, in either case, would continue to wear the hat as COMAFK, under either CINCUNC or COMUSKOREA. As such, he would have operational control over assigned USAF and ROKAF units, but no control over deployed units. The end result of this organization provides that, under any contingency, the USAF forces deployed to Korea would remain under operational control of USAF commands. 18/

In many respects the control of air forces is similar to the arrangements in effect in SEA. The Commander, 314th AD as COMAFK, is responsible for the air defense of South Korea and the close air support (CAS) of UN ground forces. In this role he is responsive to either CINCUNC or COMUSKOREA depending on the circumstances and exercises operational control over only assigned forces.

The Commander, 5th ADVON, is responsible for the air superiority and interdiction role (out-country). He utilizes deployed forces which would remain under the operational control of PACAF with the actual control being exercised by the Commander, 5AF ADVON. This was expressed in a CINCPACAF message.[19/]

> *"...Planning and execution of air operations, other than close air support of UN operations (if required) be accomplished through established PACOM Service Commanders: CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF."*

As in 1953, there is no single air commander for overall air operations and activities. Naval Air Forces remain under control of their own service and are responsible for only coordination and liaison with other air elements.[20/] Liaison teams have been provided by the USAF and by the Navy to accommodate each other and are presently in place. Their principal responsibilities are liaison and coordination.

Strategic Air Command units, deployed in support of the Korean operations, are also not under operational control of 5AF ADVON, but only coordinate their activities through them. Contingency planning and targeting have been

FIFTH AIR FORCE ADVON-ORGANIZATION



As briefed 12 Mar 68

FIGURE 5-2

SECRET

SECRET

COMMAND RELATIONS AS OF 29 JANUARY 1968



FIGURE 5-3

accomplished by 5AF ADVON/PACAF.[21] As a matter of interest, as late as 14 March, 5AF ADVON had not received complete and final approval or disapproval of various contingency planning options, which were developed under the code name "Fresh Storm" (TS). Concerned Navy elements had not provided the ADVON with portions of the plan for which they were responsible.

In this plan, the general areas of responsibility of each service's air component were: (1) Navy targets being generally east of 127° Longitude; (2) USAF tactical forces having targets west of 127°; (3) Strategic elements have the majority of their targets west of 127° but there is one eastern target.[22] Allowance was made for ROKAF participation in certain options developed under Fresh Storm (TS). However, planning was, and is, being conducted on a strictly NOFORN basis[23] until coordination with ROKAF is specifically authorized by JCS. ROKAF will not be advised of such planning pending approval of higher authority. Strike operations and other activities of the PACAF forces would be maintained through a TACS, with a few modifications because of the NOFORN restriction. Other contingency planning was accomplished for possible BANNER operation, Wonsan retaliatory operations, and operations developed under the code name "Freedom Drop" (TS).

The Tactical Air Control System

Prior to the Pueblo incident, the classic Tactical Air Control System (TACS) did not exist.[24] The principal reason for its absence was ROKAF's being primarily defense-oriented and configured--there was no requirement for a complete offensive net. The ROKAF, in conjunction with the 314th AD, did have an Air Defense Control Center (ADCC) established with communications

quite appropriatedly geared for defensive operations. There was a facility located in the ADCC--a Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) but it lacked adequate communications facilities and manning. 25/

The initial concept for tactical control of PACAF forces called for two separate control agencies. Overall control, but specifically for out-country operations, was to be maintained through the 5AF ADVON Command Center located at Osan, Korea. A TACC, with equipment airlifted from the CONUS, was to be established at Taegu where, hopefully, it would be collocated with the Army TOC. The TACC would control CAS operations, should the situation in Korea develop into such an action. 26/ CINCPACAF concurred with the concept proposed by 5AF, and requested that necessary TACC supporting equipment, which was not available within PACAF, together with augmentee personnel, be supplied from CONUS resources. 27/ Additionally, CINCPACAF and the Commander, 5AF ADVON, agreed the establishment of a TACC would provide a contingency option for control of the forces, if it should become necessary to abandon the Osan facility. 28/ However, as of 14 March the Taegu TACC had not been erected, as the Army was still undecided where it would locate its Tactical Operations Center (TOC).

Almost concurrently, two Direct Air Support Centers (DASCs) were to be established; one to the north of Osan in I Corp at Uijongbu, the other location as yet undetermined. The necessary communication gear was ordered so that the DASCs would be fully tied in with the TACC. FAC/ALO personnel were provided from PACAF/5AF and CONUS resources. 29/ On arrival, the FACs were attached to army ground units, as there were no airborne capabilities

at that time. Presently, efforts are underway to acquire an airborne FAC capability.

The concept of operations was changed somewhat with the arrival of 19th Air Force personnel and development of a TACC/TACS at Osan. (The TACC has been referred to as belonging to both 314AD and 5AF ADVON. For purposes of this report, the ADVON is depicted as controlling the TACC.) Implementation of applicable manuals, which outlined the establishment of a TACS, was effected, and facilities and communications nets began to expand. 30/ The 5AF ADVON Command Center was forecast to revert back to normal functions of a Command Center, as more of the load was assumed by the TACC. 31/ The TACC, as of 14 March, still lacked complete, necessary tactical communications and working facilities. However, work was well underway to make it operational as soon as possible. Twelve circuits, of a total of 75 needed, had been installed, with many others due to be completed shortly.

Organization of the TACC itself will vary somewhat from that which is portrayed in PACAF Manual 55-15. This is largely due to the NOFORN restriction. A separate division will be established for future planning efforts; it will be physically apart at a location near to the TACC. It will perform basically the same function as any plans section of any TACC, but the separation is required so that adequate security may be maintained. Operations orders to the units will continue to be handled in the conventional way. 32/

It should be noted that because a TACS system was lacking in Korea at the start of the buildup, it does not mean, or infer, that combat operations--

especially retaliation--had it become necessary, could not have been carried out and carried out effectively. Existing facilities and equipment in place would have been adequate to mount such operations, though sustained operations would have been difficult. With the large increase in USAF forces in Korea, however, and the assumption that this would be a long-range, continuing operation, actions were initiated to improve the command and control system, adequately staff it, and provide a more effective, responsive, and flexible system.

Changes to the entire system will undoubtedly occur as weaknesses appear, and as experience is gained through day-to-day operations. Minor personnel adjustments may also be required, as will changes to certain management procedures. For example, discussion is taking place about reducing the 5AF ADVON staff, with a greater portion of the staff functions being performed by the staff at 5AF proper. 33/

In summary, the deployed PACAF forces remained under Air Force control, with the 5AF ADVON being established to more effectively exercise control and assure a more efficient operation. The 314th AD Commander remained as the Air Component Commander under CINCUNC and as such, maintained operational control of the ROKAF. He also provided administrative and logistical support to the units deployed in Korea.

The ADVON Command Center was expanded initially to provide better control. Then the process of establishing a TACS was begun, so that more satisfactory control facilities would be provided for the conduct of all types of tactical air operations. Communications, tactical and command, were

rapidly being brought up to standards, and should be more than adequate for most contingencies in a very short time.

FOOTNOTES

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5. (S) LIMDIS msg, 5AF to CINCPACAF, 251012Z Jan 68.
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(S) Msg, 475TFW to 5AFCC, 250715Z Jan 68.

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APPENDIX I

AIRCRAFT SUPPORT FOR WESTPAC NORTH
(Figures Obtained from PACAF DIGEST
and Its Predecessor)

TYPE A/C	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
B-26	162	142	62											
B-29	115	14	12											
C-45	11	9												
C-46	62	54												
C-47	124	99	92											
C-54	20	19	21											
C-119	94	136	113	30	28									
C-124	26	25	25	9										
F-51	2	36												
F-80	105	3	3											
F-84	387	163	96	30	10	8								
F-86	534	540	436	142	142	52	52							
F-94	76	32												
RF-80	46	31	4											
RF-86	3	15	17											
F-100			2	4	58	90	190	184	166	125	100	36	18	
B-57				5	37	40	46	49	50	54	48			
RB-66					20	24								
RF-84					20									
RF-101						20	36	40	30	31	32	32	16	
C-130						22	44	49		10	10	10	11	11
F-104						10								
RB-50					9	9	9	8	8					
T-33					10	10								
F-102							74	95	102	86	86		26	26
RB-57							6	7	7	7	7	7	2	2
F-105										39	100	186	108	36
F-4C												18		36
RF-4C														14
TOTALS	1767	1318	883	220	334	285	457	432	363	352	383	289	181	125

APPENDIX II

FIFTH AIR FORCE DEPLOYMENTS TO SEA
(TDY to SEA Nov 64 - Nov 65)

UNIT	BASE	DEPLOYED BASE	DATES DEPLOYED
80 TFS	YOKOTA	KORAT	20 NOV 64 - 6 JAN 65
44 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	18 DEC 64 - 28 FEB 65
67 TFS	KADENA	DA NANG	12 JAN 65 - 18 JAN 65
12 TFS	KADENA	DA NANG	1 FEB 65 - 20 FEB 65
12 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	8 FEB 65 - 15 MAR 65
67 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	18 FEB 65 - 26 APR 65
36 TFS	YOKOTA	TAKHLI	4 MAR 65 - 4 MAY 65
44 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	24 APR 65 - 22 JUN 65
12 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	15 JUN 65 - 25 AUG 65
80 TFS	YOKOTA	TAKHLI	27 JUN 65 - 26 AUG 65
67 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	25 AUG 65 - 22 OCT 65
36 TFS	YOKOTA	TAKHLI	26 AUG 65 - 12 NOV 65
44 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	19 OCT 65 - 28 OCT 65
35 TFS	YOKOTA	TAKHLI	24 OCT 65 - 12 NOV 65

APPENDIX III

CLEAR WATER FIFTH AIR FORCE MAJOR FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES

Pre-Clear Water Fifth Air Force Structure		Action	30 Jun 65 Structure End Position	
		ITAZUKE AIR BASE		
8 TFW		to TAC (Hq only)	Base on FOL Status	
35 TFS	25 F-105	to 41 AD	---	---
36 TFS	25 F-105	to 41 AD	---	---
80 TFS	25 F-105	to 41 AD	---	---
68 FIS	20 F-102	to TAC	---	---
		MISAWA AIR BASE (39 AD)		
416 TFS	25 F-100	to TAC	---	---
531 TFS	25 F-100	to TAC	---	---
4 FIS	20 F-102	to TAC	---	---
45 TRS	16 RF-101	n/a CW	45 TRS	16 RF-101
			614 TFS*	18 F-100
			430 TFS*	18 F-100
		YOKOTA AIR BASE (41AD)		
3 BW(T)	48 B-57	to TAC (Hq only)	---	---
8 BS(T)		to 13AF	---	---
13 BS(T)		to 13AF	---	---
90 BS(T)		to TAC	---	---
40 FIS	20 F-102	to TAC	---	---
421 ARS	20 KB-50	Discontinued	---	---
6091 RS	17 B-57/C-130/C-97	n/a CW	6091 RS	17 B-57/C-130/C-97
			35 TFS	25 F-105
			36 TFS	25 F-105
			80 TFS	25 F-105
		KADENA AIR BASE (313 AD)		
15 TRS	16 RF-101	n/a CW	15 TRS	16 RF-101
498 TMG	32 TM-76	n/a CW	498 TMG	32 TM-76
18 TFW		n/a CW	18 TFW	
12 TFS	25 F-105	n/a CW	12 TFS	25 F-105
44 TFS	25 F-105	n/a CW	44 TFS	25 F-105
67 TFS	25 F-105	n/a CW	67 TFS	25 F-105
		NAHA AIR BASE (51 FIW)		
16 FIS	26 F-102	Discontinued	---	---
			559 TFS*	18 F-4C

* TAC Rotational Organizations

APPENDIX IV

TAC ROTATIONAL SQUADRONS TO FIFTH AIR FORCE BASES FROM JUNE 1964

39 AIR DIVISION - MISAWA AB

478 TFS	F-100	Jun 64 - Sep 64	Cannon AFB
523 TFS	F-100	Jun 64 - Sep 64	"
430 TFS	F-100	Sep 64 - Dec 64	"
481 TFS	F-100	Sep 64 - Dec 64	"
429 TFS	F-100	21 Nov 64 - 15 Feb 65	"
524 TFS	F-100	12 Dec 64 - 24 Mar 65	"
478 TFS	F-100	15 Feb 65 - 16 May 65	"
523 TFS	F-100	24 Mar 65 - 30 Jun 65	"
430 TFS	F-100	11 May 65 - 9 Aug 65	"
614 TFS	F-100	30 Jun 65 - 19 Nov 65	England AFB
90 TFS	F-100	8 Aug 65 - 7 Dec 65	"
356 TFS	F-100	29 Nov 65 - PCS	Myrtle Beach AFB
612 TFS	F-100	29 Nov 65 - PCS	England AFB

41 AIR DIVISION - YOKOTA AB

357 TFS	F-105	9 Aug 64 - Nov 64	McConnell AFB
469 TFS	F-105	30 Nov 64 - 7 Jan 65	"
561 TFS	F-105	6 Mar 65 - 6 Jul 65	"
335 TFS	F-105	6 Jul 65 - 5 Nov 65	Seymour Johnson AFB

313 AIR DIVISION - KADENA AB

469 TFS	F-105	7 Jan 65 - 13 Mar 65	McConnell AFB
354 TFS	F-105	8 Mar 65 - 19 Mar 65	" *
421 TFS	F-105	7 Apr 65 - 27 Aug 65	"
469 TFS	F-105	20 Aug 65 - 6 Nov 65	"

51 FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING - NAHA AB

555 TFS	F-4C	11 Dec 64 - 11 Mar 65	MacDill AFB
558 TFS	F-4C	11 Mar 65 - 15 Jun 65	"
559 TFS	F-4C	13 Jun 65 - 8 Nov 65	"
555 TFS	F-4C	10 Dec 65 - 11 Mar 66	"

* 354 TFS was redeployed to Korat AB from Kadena 19 Mar 65 to 12 Jun 65 when relieved by 357 TFS. Personnel only returned to McConnell AFB 18 Jun 65.

APPENDIX V

FIFTH AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS

	30 June 1964		30 June 1965*		31 July 1966		31 December 1967	
	Nr of Units	Nr and Type of A/C	Nr of Units	Nr and Type of A/C	Nr of Units	Nr and Type of A/C	Nr of Units	Nr and Type of A/C
Tactical Fighter Sq	8	200 F-100/ F-105	6 4**	150 F-105 36 F-100	7	108 F-105 18 F-100	4	36 F-105 36 F-4C
Fighter Interceptor Sq	4	86 F-102	1**	36 F-105 18 F-4C	1	26 F-102	1	26 F-102
Tactical Reconn Sq	2	32 RF-101	2	32 RF-101	1	16 RF-101	1	14 RF-4C
Tactical Bomb Sq	3	48 B-57	-	----	-	----	-	----
Aerial Refuel Sq	1	20 KB-50	-	----	-	----	-	----
Recon Sq	1	17 B-57/ C-130/ C-97	1	17 B-57/ C-130/ C-97	1	2 RB-57 11 C-130	1	2 RB-57 11 C-130
Tactical Missile Gp	1	32 TM-76	1	32 TM-76	1	32 TM-76	1	32 TM-76
TOTALS	19 Sq 1 TMG	403 A/C 32 Miss	14 Sq 1 TMG	289 A/C 32 Miss	10 Sq 1 TMG	181 A/C 32 Miss	7 Sq 1 TMG	125 A/C 32 Miss

* REDUCTION TO MEET CLEAR WATER OBJECTIVES
** TAC ROTATIONAL FORCE

GLOSSARY

AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
AD	Air Defense
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADCC	Air Defense Control Center
ADVON	Advance Echelon
AFK	Air Forces Korea
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
AOB	Air Order of Battle
ASAP	As Soon As Possible
ATC	Air Traffic Control
CAB	Civil Aeronautics Bureau (Korean)
CAS	Close Air Support
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
COMAFK	Commander, Air Forces Korea
COMUSKOREA	Commander, U.S. Forces Korea
CONUS	Continental United States
CP	Command Post
CR	Combat Readiness
CRC	Control and Reporting Center
CRP	Control and Reporting Post
CSAF	Chief of Staff, Air Force
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DC	Direction Center
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
FAA	Federal Aviation Agency
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FECR	Far Eastern Communications Region
FIS	Fighter Interceptor Squadron
FOL	Forward Operating Location
GCA	Ground Controlled Approach
ILS	Instrument Landing System
ITT	International Telephone and Telegraph
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOC	Joint Operations Center
MHE	Materials Handling Equipment
MSB	Main Support Base

NAVAIDS	Navigational Aids
NEA	Northeast Asia
NFLO	Naval Fleet Liaison Officer
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OR	Operationally Ready
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RAPCON	Radar Approach Control
Recce	Reconnaissance
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKAF	South Korean Air Force
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SEA	Southeast Asia
SIOP	Single Integrated Operations Plan
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TACAN	Tactical Air Control and Navigation
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACS	Tactical Air Control System
TDY	Temporary Duty
TEWS	Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TRS	Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
TS	Top Secret
UE	Unit Equipment
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WRM	War Readiness Material

CHAPTER IV

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8. (S) Military Intelligence Summary, Section X, Eastern Asia, 1 Oct 67, AP-210-6-10C-67-INT, Defense Intelligence Agency.

9. (SNF) Special Study, DCS/I, PACAF, undated.

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1. (S) 5AF History, Vol II, Jul-Dec 1953.

2. (S) Interviews with Col. T. D. Robertson, 5AF ADVON DCS/Ops; Col. F. J. Vetort, 5AF ADVON Dir TACC; Lt. Col. J. M. Pelter, 5AF ADVON Ops Staff Officer, 13 Mar 68.

3. Ibid.

4. (S) 5AF History, Vol I, Jan-Jul 1953.

5. Ibid.

6. Robert F. Futrell, The U.S. Air Force in Korea 1950-1953; Duell, Sloan and Pierce, p. 38-72.

7. (S) 5AF History, Vol I, Jul-Dec 1954.

8. (S) 5AF History, Vol I, Jul-Dec 1957.

9. (TS) PACAF OPLAN 27-63.

10. (S) Msg, 5AF to 314AD, 231332Z Jan 68.

11. (S) Msg, 5AF ADVON to CINCPACAF, 300814Z Jan 68.

12. (TS) Msg, 5AF to CINCPACAF, 270945Z Jan 68.

13. (TS) Msg, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 272100Z Jan 68.

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15. (TS) Msg, CINCPACAF to 5AF, subj: "Command Relations Relative to Current Situation in Korea (C)", 010330Z Feb 68.

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17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. (S) Interviews with 5AF ADVON personnel, 13 Mar 68.

22. Ibid.

23. (TS) Msg, PACAF to 5AF, 102355Z Feb 68.

24. Op cited, Interview Robertson, Pelter.

25. Ibid.

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27. (TS) SPECAT msg, CINCPACAF to 5AF Comdr, 020345Z Feb 68.

28. (TS) Msg, 5AF to CINCPACAF, Gen McKee's Estimate of the Situation (U), 311930Z Jan 68.

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30. Op cited. Interviews.

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32. Ibid.

33. Interviews with 5AF ADVON personnel, 13 Mar 68.

APPENDIX I

AIRCRAFT SUPPORT FOR WESTPAC NORTH
(Figures Obtained from PACAF DIGEST
and Its Predecessor)

TYPE A/C	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
B-26	162	142	62											
B-29	115	14	12											
C-45	11	9												
C-46	62	54												
C-47	124	99	92											
C-54	20	19	21											
C-119	94	136	113	30	28									
C-124	26	25	25	9										
F-51	2	36												
F-80	105	3	3											
F-84	387	163	96	30	10	8								
F-86	534	540	436	142	142	52	52							
F-94	76	32												
RF-80	46	31	4											
RF-86	3	15	17											
F-100			2	4	58	90	190	184	166	125	100	36	18	
B-57				5	37	40	46	49	50	54	48			
RB-66					20	24								
RF-84					20									
RF-101						20	36	40	30	31	32	32	16	
C-130						22	44	49		10	10	10	11	11
F-104						10								
RB-50					9	9	9	8	8					
T-33					10	10								
F-102							74	95	102	86	86		26	26
RB-57							6	7	7	7	7	7	2	2
F-105										39	100	186	108	36
F-4C												18		36
RF-4C														14
TOTALS	1767	1318	883	220	334	285	457	432	363	352	383	289	181	125

APPENDIX II

FIFTH AIR FORCE DEPLOYMENTS TO SEA
(TDY to SEA Nov 64 - Nov 65)

UNIT	BASE	DEPLOYED BASE	DATES DEPLOYED
80 TFS	YOKOTA	KORAT	20 NOV 64 - 6 JAN 65
44 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	18 DEC 64 - 28 FEB 65
67 TFS	KADENA	DA NANG	12 JAN 65 - 18 JAN 65
12 TFS	KADENA	DA NANG	1 FEB 65 - 20 FEB 65
12 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	8 FEB 65 - 15 MAR 65
67 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	18 FEB 65 - 26 APR 65
36 TFS	YOKOTA	TAKHLI	4 MAR 65 - 4 MAY 65
44 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	24 APR 65 - 22 JUN 65
12 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	15 JUN 65 - 25 AUG 65
80 TFS	YOKOTA	TAKHLI	27 JUN 65 - 26 AUG 65
67 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	25 AUG 65 - 22 OCT 65
36 TFS	YOKOTA	TAKHLI	26 AUG 65 - 12 NOV 65
44 TFS	KADENA	KORAT	19 OCT 65 - 28 OCT 65
35 TFS	YOKOTA	TAKHLI	24 OCT 65 - 12 NOV 65

APPENDIX III

CLEAR WATER FIFTH AIR FORCE MAJOR FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES

Pre-Clear Water Fifth Air Force Structure		Action	30 Jun 65 Structure End Position	
		ITAZUKE AIR BASE		
8 TFW		to TAC (Hq only)	Base on FOL Status	
35 TFS	25 F-105	to 41 AD	---	---
36 TFS	25 F-105	to 41 AD	---	---
80 TFS	25 F-105	to 41 AD	---	---
68 FIS	20 F-102	to TAC	---	---
		MISAWA AIR BASE (39 AD)		
416 TFS	25 F-100	to TAC	---	---
531 TFS	25 F-100	to TAC	---	---
4 FIS	20 F-102	to TAC	---	---
45 TRS	16 RF-101	n/a CW	45 TRS	16 RF-101
			614 TFS*	18 F-100
			430 TFS*	18 F-100
		YOKOTA AIR BASE (41AD)		
3 BW(T)	48 B-57	to TAC (Hq only)	---	---
8 BS(T)		to 13AF	---	---
13 BS(T)		to 13AF	---	---
90 BS(T)		to TAC	---	---
40 FIS	20 F-102	to TAC	---	---
421 ARS	20 KB-50	Discontinued	---	---
6091 RS 17 B-57/C-130/C-97		n/a CW	6091 RS 17 B-57/C-130/C-97	
			35 TFS	25 F-105
			36 TFS	25 F-105
			80 TFS	25 F-105
		KADENA AIR BASE (313 AD)		
15 TRS	16 RF-101	n/a CW	15 TRS	16 RF-101
498 TMG	32 TM-76	n/a CW	498 TMG	32 TM-76
18 TFW		n/a CW	18 TFW	
12 TFS	25 F-105	n/a CW	12 TFS	25 F-105
44 TFS	25 F-105	n/a CW	44 TFS	25 F-105
67 TFS	25 F-105	n/a CW	67 TFS	25 F-105
		NAHA AIR BASE (51 FIW)		
16 FIS	26 F-102	Discontinued	---	---
			559 TFS*	18 F-4C

* TAC Rotational Organizations

APPENDIX IV

TAC ROTATIONAL SQUADRONS TO FIFTH AIR FORCE BASES FROM JUNE 1964

39 AIR DIVISION - MISAWA AB

478 TFS	F-100	Jun 64 - Sep 64	Cannon AFB
523 TFS	F-100	Jun 64 - Sep 64	"
430 TFS	F-100	Sep 64 - Dec 64	"
481 TFS	F-100	Sep 64 - Dec 64	"
429 TFS	F-100	21 Nov 64 - 15 Feb 65	"
524 TFS	F-100	12 Dec 64 - 24 Mar 65	"
478 TFS	F-100	15 Feb 65 - 16 May 65	"
523 TFS	F-100	24 Mar 65 - 30 Jun 65	"
430 TFS	F-100	11 May 65 - 9 Aug 65	"
614 TFS	F-100	30 Jun 65 - 19 Nov 65	England AFB
90 TFS	F-100	8 Aug 65 - 7 Dec 65	"
356 TFS	F-100	29 Nov 65 - PCS	Myrtle Beach AFB
612 TFS	F-100	29 Nov 65 - PCS	England AFB

41 AIR DIVISION - YOKOTA AB

357 TFS	F-105	9 Aug 64 - Nov 64	McConnell AFB
469 TFS	F-105	30 Nov 64 - 7 Jan 65	"
561 TFS	F-105	6 Mar 65 - 6 Jul 65	"
335 TFS	F-105	6 Jul 65 - 5 Nov 65	Seymour Johnson AFB

313 AIR DIVISION - KADENA AB

469 TFS	F-105	7 Jan 65 - 13 Mar 65	McConnell AFB
354 TFS	F-105	8 Mar 65 - 19 Mar 65	" *
421 TFS	F-105	7 Apr 65 - 27 Aug 65	"
469 TFS	F-105	20 Aug 65 - 6 Nov 65	"

51 FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING - NAHA AB

555 TFS	F-4C	11 Dec 64 - 11 Mar 65	MacDill AFB
558 TFS	F-4C	11 Mar 65 - 15 Jun 65	"
559 TFS	F-4C	13 Jun 65 - 8 Nov 65	"
555 TFS	F-4C	10 Dec 65 - 11 Mar 66	"

* 354 TFS was redeployed to Korat AB from Kadena 19 Mar 65 to 12 Jun 65 when relieved by 357 TFS. Personnel only returned to McConnell AFB 18 Jun 65.

APPENDIX V

FIFTH AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS

	30 June 1964		30 June 1965*		31 July 1966		31 December 1967	
	Nr of Units	Nr and Type of A/C	Nr of Units	Nr and Type of A/C	Nr of Units	Nr and Type of A/C	Nr of Units	Nr and Type of A/C
Tactical Fighter Sq	8	200 F-100/ F-105	6 4**	150 F-105 36 F-100	7	108 F-105 18 F-100	4	36 F-105 36 F-4C
Fighter Interceptor Sq	4	86 F-102	1**	36 F-105 18 F-4C	1	26 F-102	1	26 F-102
Tactical Reconn Sq	2	32 RF-101	2	32 RF-101	1	16 RF-101	1	14 RF-4C
Tactical Bomb Sq	3	48 B-57	-	----	-	----	-	----
Aerial Refuel Sq	1	20 KB-50	-	----	-	----	-	----
Recon Sq	1	17 B-57/ C-130/ C-97	1	17 B-57/ C-130/ C-97	1	2 RB-57 11 C-130	1	2 RB-57 11 C-130
Tactical Missile Gp	1	32 TM-76	1	32 TM-76	1	32 TM-76	1	32 TM-76
TOTALS	19 Sq 1 TMG	403 A/C 32 Miss	14 Sq 1 TMG	289 A/C 32 Miss	10 Sq 1 TMG	181 A/C 32 Miss	7 Sq 1 TMG	125 A/C 32 Miss

* REDUCTION TO MEET CLEAR WATER OBJECTIVES
** TAC ROTATIONAL FORCE

GLOSSARY

AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
AD	Air Defense
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADCC	Air Defense Control Center
ADVON	Advance Echelon
AFK	Air Forces Korea
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
AOB	Air Order of Battle
ASAP	As Soon As Possible
ATC	Air Traffic Control
CAB	Civil Aeronautics Bureau (Korean)
CAS	Close Air Support
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
COMAFK	Commander, Air Forces Korea
COMUSKOREA	Commander, U.S. Forces Korea
CONUS	Continental United States
CP	Command Post
CR	Combat Readiness
CRC	Control and Reporting Center
CRP	Control and Reporting Post
CSAF	Chief of Staff, Air Force
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DC	Direction Center
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
FAA	Federal Aviation Agency
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FECR	Far Eastern Communications Region
FIS	Fighter Interceptor Squadron
FOL	Forward Operating Location
GCA	Ground Controlled Approach
ILS	Instrument Landing System
ITT	International Telephone and Telegraph
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOC	Joint Operations Center
MHE	Materials Handling Equipment
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OR	Operationally Ready
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PCS	Permanent Change of Station
RAPCON	Radar Approach Control
Recce	Reconnaissance
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ROKAF	South Korean Air Force
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SEA	Southeast Asia
SIOP	Single Integrated Operations Plan
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TACAN	Tactical Air Control and Navigation
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACS	Tactical Air Control System
TDY	Temporary Duty
TEWS	Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TRS	Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
TS	Top Secret
UE	Unit Equipment
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WRM	War Readiness Material